1 /*
2  * CDDL HEADER START
3  *
4  * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
5  * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
6  * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
7  *
8  * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
9  * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
10  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
11  * and limitations under the License.
12  *
13  * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
14  * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
15  * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
16  * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
17  * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
18  *
19  * CDDL HEADER END
20  */
21 /*
22  * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
23  * Use is subject to license terms.
24  *
25  * Copyright 2020 Joyent, Inc.
26  */
27 
28 #include <pthread.h>
29 #include <stdlib.h>
30 #include <string.h>
31 #include <strings.h>
32 #include <sys/types.h>
33 #include <security/cryptoki.h>
34 #include <sys/crypto/common.h>
35 #include <aes_impl.h>
36 #include <blowfish_impl.h>
37 #include <des_impl.h>
38 #include <arcfour.h>
39 #include <cryptoutil.h>
40 #include "softGlobal.h"
41 #include "softSession.h"
42 #include "softObject.h"
43 #include "softDSA.h"
44 #include "softRSA.h"
45 #include "softDH.h"
46 #include "softEC.h"
47 #include "softMAC.h"
48 #include "softOps.h"
49 #include "softKeys.h"
50 #include "softKeystore.h"
51 #include "softSSL.h"
52 #include "softASN1.h"
53 
54 
55 #define	local_min(a, b)	((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
56 
57 static CK_RV
58 soft_pkcs12_pbe(soft_session_t *, CK_MECHANISM_PTR, soft_object_t *);
59 
60 /*
61  * Create a temporary key object struct by filling up its template attributes.
62  */
63 CK_RV
64 soft_gen_keyobject(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,  CK_ULONG ulCount,
65     soft_object_t **objp, soft_session_t *sp,
66     CK_OBJECT_CLASS class, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, CK_ULONG keylen, CK_ULONG mode,
67     boolean_t internal)
68 {
69 	CK_RV rv;
70 	soft_object_t *new_objp = NULL;
71 
72 	new_objp = calloc(1, sizeof (soft_object_t));
73 	if (new_objp == NULL) {
74 		return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
75 	}
76 
77 	new_objp->extra_attrlistp = NULL;
78 
79 	/*
80 	 * Validate attribute template and fill in the attributes
81 	 * in the soft_object_t.
82 	 */
83 	rv = soft_build_key(pTemplate, ulCount, new_objp, class, key_type,
84 	    keylen, mode);
85 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
86 		goto fail_cleanup1;
87 	}
88 
89 	/*
90 	 * If generating a key is an internal request (i.e. not a C_XXX
91 	 * API request), then skip the following checks.
92 	 */
93 	if (!internal) {
94 		rv = soft_pin_expired_check(new_objp);
95 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
96 			goto fail_cleanup2;
97 		}
98 
99 		rv = soft_object_write_access_check(sp, new_objp);
100 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
101 			goto fail_cleanup2;
102 		}
103 	}
104 
105 	/* Initialize the rest of stuffs in soft_object_t. */
106 	(void) pthread_mutex_init(&new_objp->object_mutex, NULL);
107 	new_objp->magic_marker = SOFTTOKEN_OBJECT_MAGIC;
108 
109 	/* Write the new token object to the keystore */
110 	if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(new_objp)) {
111 		new_objp->version = 1;
112 		new_objp->session_handle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
113 		soft_add_token_object_to_slot(new_objp);
114 
115 		set_objecthandle(new_objp);
116 		*objp = new_objp;
117 
118 		return (CKR_OK);
119 	}
120 
121 	new_objp->session_handle = sp->handle;
122 
123 	/* Add the new object to the session's object list. */
124 	soft_add_object_to_session(new_objp, sp);
125 
126 	set_objecthandle(new_objp);
127 	*objp = new_objp;
128 
129 	return (CKR_OK);
130 
131 fail_cleanup2:
132 	/*
133 	 * When any error occurs after soft_build_key(), we will need to
134 	 * clean up the memory allocated by the soft_build_key().
135 	 */
136 	soft_cleanup_object(new_objp);
137 
138 fail_cleanup1:
139 	if (new_objp) {
140 		/*
141 		 * The storage allocated inside of this object should have
142 		 * been cleaned up by the soft_build_key() if it failed.
143 		 * Therefore, we can safely free the object.
144 		 */
145 		free(new_objp);
146 	}
147 
148 	return (rv);
149 }
150 
151 CK_RV
152 soft_genkey(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
153     CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
154 {
155 
156 	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
157 	soft_object_t *secret_key;
158 	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
159 	CK_ULONG keylen = 0;
160 	CK_ULONG i;
161 	int des_strength = 0;
162 	int retry = 0;
163 	int keyfound = 0;
164 	boolean_t is_ssl_mech = B_FALSE;
165 
166 	switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
167 	case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
168 		key_type = CKK_DES;
169 		break;
170 
171 	case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
172 		key_type = CKK_DES2;
173 		break;
174 
175 	case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
176 		key_type = CKK_DES3;
177 		break;
178 
179 	case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
180 		key_type = CKK_AES;
181 		break;
182 
183 	case CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN:
184 		key_type = CKK_BLOWFISH;
185 		break;
186 
187 	case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
188 		key_type = CKK_RC4;
189 		break;
190 
191 	case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
192 	case CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
193 		if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
194 		    pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof (CK_VERSION))
195 			return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
196 		is_ssl_mech = B_TRUE;
197 		key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
198 		keylen = 48;
199 		break;
200 
201 	case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
202 		keyfound = 0;
203 		for (i = 0; i < ulCount && !keyfound; i++) {
204 			if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE &&
205 			    pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) {
206 				key_type = *((CK_KEY_TYPE*)pTemplate[i].pValue);
207 				keyfound = 1;
208 			}
209 		}
210 		if (!keyfound)
211 			return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
212 		/*
213 		 * Make sure that parameters were given for this
214 		 * mechanism.
215 		 */
216 		if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
217 		    pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
218 		    sizeof (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS))
219 			return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
220 		break;
221 
222 	case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
223 		keyfound = 0;
224 		for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++) {
225 			if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE &&
226 			    pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) {
227 				key_type = *((CK_KEY_TYPE*)pTemplate[i].pValue);
228 				keyfound = 1;
229 			}
230 			if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN &&
231 			    pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) {
232 				keylen = *((CK_ULONG*)pTemplate[i].pValue);
233 			}
234 		}
235 		/* If a keytype was specified, it had better be CKK_RC4 */
236 		if (keyfound && key_type != CKK_RC4)
237 			return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT);
238 		else if (!keyfound)
239 			key_type = CKK_RC4;
240 
241 		/* If key length was specified, it better be 16 bytes */
242 		if (keylen != 0 && keylen != 16)
243 			return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT);
244 
245 		/*
246 		 * Make sure that parameters were given for this
247 		 * mechanism.
248 		 */
249 		if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
250 		    pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
251 		    sizeof (CK_PBE_PARAMS))
252 			return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
253 		break;
254 	default:
255 		return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
256 	}
257 
258 	/* Create a new object for secret key. */
259 	rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pTemplate, ulCount, &secret_key, session_p,
260 	    CKO_SECRET_KEY, key_type, keylen, SOFT_GEN_KEY, B_FALSE);
261 
262 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
263 		return (rv);
264 	}
265 
266 	switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
267 	case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
268 		/*
269 		 * Set up key value len since it is not a required
270 		 * attribute for C_GenerateKey.
271 		 */
272 		keylen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES_KEYSIZE;
273 		des_strength = DES;
274 		break;
275 
276 	case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
277 		/*
278 		 * Set up key value len since it is not a required
279 		 * attribute for C_GenerateKey.
280 		 */
281 		keylen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES2_KEYSIZE;
282 		des_strength = DES2;
283 		break;
284 
285 	case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
286 		/*
287 		 * Set up key value len since it is not a required
288 		 * attribute for C_GenerateKey.
289 		 */
290 		keylen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES3_KEYSIZE;
291 		des_strength = DES3;
292 		break;
293 
294 	case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
295 	case CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
296 		secret_key->bool_attr_mask |= DERIVE_BOOL_ON;
297 	/* FALLTHRU */
298 
299 	case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
300 	case CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN:
301 	case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
302 	case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
303 		keylen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key);
304 		break;
305 
306 	case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
307 		/*
308 		 * PKCS#11 does not allow one to specify key
309 		 * sizes for DES and 3DES, so we must set it here
310 		 * when using PBKD2 algorithms.
311 		 */
312 		if (key_type == CKK_DES) {
313 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES_KEYSIZE;
314 			des_strength = DES;
315 		} else if (key_type == CKK_DES3) {
316 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES3_KEYSIZE;
317 			des_strength = DES3;
318 		}
319 
320 		keylen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key);
321 		break;
322 	}
323 
324 	if ((OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key) = malloc(keylen)) == NULL) {
325 		if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
326 			soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
327 		else
328 			soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
329 			    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
330 
331 		return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
332 	}
333 	switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
334 	case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
335 		/*
336 		 * Use the PBE algorithm described in PKCS#11 section
337 		 * 12.33 to derive the key.
338 		 */
339 		rv = soft_pkcs12_pbe(session_p, pMechanism, secret_key);
340 		break;
341 	case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
342 		/* Generate keys using PKCS#5 PBKD2 algorithm */
343 		rv = soft_generate_pkcs5_pbkdf2_key(session_p, pMechanism,
344 		    secret_key);
345 		if (rv == CKR_OK && des_strength > 0) {
346 			/* Perform weak key checking for DES and DES3. */
347 			if (des_keycheck(OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key),
348 			    des_strength, OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key)) ==
349 			    B_FALSE) {
350 				/* We got a weak secret key. */
351 				rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
352 			}
353 		}
354 		break;
355 	default:
356 		do {
357 			/* If this fails, bail out */
358 			rv = CKR_OK;
359 			if (pkcs11_get_urandom(
360 			    OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key), keylen) < 0) {
361 				rv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
362 				break;
363 			}
364 
365 			/* Perform weak key checking for DES and DES3. */
366 			if (des_strength > 0) {
367 				rv = CKR_OK;
368 				if (des_keycheck(OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key),
369 				    des_strength, OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key)) ==
370 				    B_FALSE) {
371 					/* We got a weak key, retry! */
372 					retry++;
373 					rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
374 				}
375 			}
376 			/*
377 			 * Copy over the SSL client version For SSL mechs
378 			 * The first two bytes of the key is the version
379 			 */
380 			if (is_ssl_mech)
381 				bcopy(pMechanism->pParameter,
382 				    OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key),
383 				    sizeof (CK_VERSION));
384 
385 		} while (rv != CKR_OK && retry < KEYGEN_RETRY);
386 		if (retry == KEYGEN_RETRY)
387 			rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
388 		break;
389 	}
390 
391 	if (rv != CKR_OK)
392 		if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
393 			soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
394 		else
395 			soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
396 			    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
397 
398 	if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key)) {
399 		/*
400 		 * All the info has been filled, so we can write to
401 		 * keystore now.
402 		 */
403 		rv = soft_put_object_to_keystore(secret_key);
404 		if (rv != CKR_OK)
405 			soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
406 	}
407 
408 	*phKey = secret_key->handle;
409 	return (rv);
410 }
411 
412 CK_RV
413 soft_genkey_pair(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
414     CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPublicAttrCount,
415     CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPrivateAttrCount,
416     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey)
417 {
418 
419 	CK_RV rv;
420 	soft_object_t *public_key, *private_key;
421 	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
422 
423 	switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
424 
425 	case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
426 		key_type = CKK_RSA;
427 		break;
428 
429 	case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
430 		key_type = CKK_DSA;
431 		break;
432 
433 	case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
434 		key_type = CKK_DH;
435 		break;
436 
437 	case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
438 		key_type = CKK_EC;
439 		break;
440 
441 	default:
442 		return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
443 	}
444 
445 	/* Create a new object for public key. */
446 	rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pPublicKeyTemplate, ulPublicAttrCount,
447 	    &public_key, session_p, CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, key_type, 0,
448 	    SOFT_GEN_KEY, B_FALSE);
449 
450 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
451 		return (rv);
452 	}
453 
454 	/* Create a new object for private key. */
455 	rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pPrivateKeyTemplate, ulPrivateAttrCount,
456 	    &private_key, session_p, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, key_type, 0,
457 	    SOFT_GEN_KEY, B_FALSE);
458 
459 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
460 		/*
461 		 * Both public key and private key must be successful.
462 		 */
463 		if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(public_key))
464 			soft_delete_token_object(public_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
465 		else
466 			soft_delete_object(session_p, public_key,
467 			    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
468 		return (rv);
469 	}
470 
471 	/*
472 	 * At this point, both public key and private key objects
473 	 * are settled with the application specified attributes.
474 	 * We are ready to generate the rest of key attributes based
475 	 * on the existing attributes.
476 	 */
477 
478 	switch (key_type) {
479 	case CKK_RSA:
480 		rv = soft_rsa_genkey_pair(public_key, private_key);
481 		break;
482 
483 	case CKK_DSA:
484 		rv = soft_dsa_genkey_pair(public_key, private_key);
485 		break;
486 
487 	case CKK_DH:
488 		rv = soft_dh_genkey_pair(public_key, private_key);
489 		private_key->bool_attr_mask |= DERIVE_BOOL_ON;
490 		break;
491 	case CKK_EC:
492 		rv = soft_ec_genkey_pair(public_key, private_key);
493 		private_key->bool_attr_mask |= DERIVE_BOOL_ON;
494 		break;
495 	}
496 
497 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
498 		if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(public_key)) {
499 			soft_delete_token_object(public_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
500 			soft_delete_token_object(private_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
501 		} else {
502 			soft_delete_object(session_p, public_key,
503 			    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
504 			soft_delete_object(session_p, private_key,
505 			    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
506 		}
507 		return (rv);
508 	}
509 
510 	if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(public_key)) {
511 		/*
512 		 * All the info has been filled, so we can write to
513 		 * keystore now.
514 		 */
515 		rv = soft_put_object_to_keystore(public_key);
516 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
517 			soft_delete_token_object(public_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
518 			soft_delete_token_object(private_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
519 			return (rv);
520 		}
521 	}
522 
523 	if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(private_key)) {
524 		rv = soft_put_object_to_keystore(private_key);
525 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
526 			/*
527 			 * We also need to delete the public token object
528 			 * from keystore.
529 			 */
530 			soft_delete_token_object(public_key, B_TRUE, B_FALSE);
531 			soft_delete_token_object(private_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
532 		}
533 	}
534 
535 	*phPublicKey = public_key->handle;
536 	*phPrivateKey = private_key->handle;
537 
538 	return (rv);
539 }
540 
541 
542 CK_RV
543 soft_key_derive_check_length(soft_object_t *secret_key, CK_ULONG max_keylen)
544 {
545 
546 	switch (secret_key->key_type) {
547 	case CKK_GENERIC_SECRET:
548 		if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) == 0) {
549 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = max_keylen;
550 			return (CKR_OK);
551 		} else if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) > max_keylen) {
552 			return (CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID);
553 		}
554 		break;
555 	case CKK_RC4:
556 	case CKK_AES:
557 	case CKK_BLOWFISH:
558 		if ((OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) == 0) ||
559 		    (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) > max_keylen)) {
560 			/* RC4 and AES has variable key length */
561 			return (CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID);
562 		}
563 		break;
564 	case CKK_DES:
565 		if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) == 0) {
566 			/* DES has a well-defined length */
567 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES_KEYSIZE;
568 			return (CKR_OK);
569 		} else if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) != DES_KEYSIZE) {
570 			return (CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID);
571 		}
572 		break;
573 	case CKK_DES2:
574 		if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) == 0) {
575 			/* DES2 has a well-defined length */
576 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES2_KEYSIZE;
577 			return (CKR_OK);
578 		} else if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) != DES2_KEYSIZE) {
579 			return (CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID);
580 		}
581 		break;
582 
583 	default:
584 		return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
585 	}
586 
587 	return (CKR_OK);
588 }
589 
590 /*
591  * PKCS#11 (12.33) says that v = 512 bits (64 bytes) for SHA1
592  * PBE methods.
593  */
594 #define	PKCS12_BUFFER_SIZE 64
595 /*
596  * PKCS#12 defines 3 different ID bytes to be used for
597  * deriving keys for different operations.
598  */
599 #define	PBE_ID_ENCRYPT	1
600 #define	PBE_ID_IV	2
601 #define	PBE_ID_MAC	3
602 #define	PBE_CEIL(a, b)	(((a)/(b)) + (((a)%(b)) > 0))
603 
604 static CK_RV
605 soft_pkcs12_pbe(soft_session_t *session_p,
606     CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, soft_object_t *derived_key)
607 {
608 	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
609 	CK_PBE_PARAMS *params = pMechanism->pParameter;
610 	CK_ULONG c, i, j, k;
611 	CK_ULONG hashSize;
612 	CK_ULONG buffSize;
613 	/*
614 	 * Terse variable names are used to make following
615 	 * the PKCS#12 spec easier.
616 	 */
617 	CK_BYTE *A = NULL;
618 	CK_BYTE *Ai = NULL;
619 	CK_BYTE *B = NULL;
620 	CK_BYTE *D = NULL;
621 	CK_BYTE *I = NULL, *S, *P;
622 	CK_BYTE *keybuf = NULL;
623 	CK_ULONG Alen, Ilen, Slen, Plen, AiLen, Blen, Dlen;
624 	CK_ULONG keysize = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(derived_key);
625 	CK_MECHANISM digest_mech;
626 
627 	/* U = hash function output bits */
628 	if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128) {
629 		hashSize = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
630 		buffSize = PKCS12_BUFFER_SIZE;
631 		digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA_1;
632 		digest_mech.pParameter = NULL;
633 		digest_mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
634 	} else {
635 		/* we only support 1 PBE mech for now */
636 		return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
637 	}
638 	keybuf = OBJ_SEC_VALUE(derived_key);
639 
640 	Blen = Dlen = buffSize;
641 	D = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(Dlen);
642 	if (D == NULL) {
643 		rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
644 		goto cleanup;
645 	}
646 
647 	B = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(Blen);
648 	if (B == NULL) {
649 		rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
650 		goto cleanup;
651 	}
652 
653 	/*
654 	 * Initialize some values and create some buffers
655 	 * that we need later.
656 	 *
657 	 * Slen = buffSize * CEIL(SaltLength/buffSize)
658 	 */
659 	Slen = buffSize * PBE_CEIL(params->ulSaltLen, buffSize);
660 
661 	/*
662 	 * Plen = buffSize * CEIL(PasswordLength/buffSize)
663 	 */
664 	Plen = buffSize * PBE_CEIL(params->ulPasswordLen, buffSize);
665 
666 	/*
667 	 * From step 4: I = S + P, so: Ilen = Slen + Plen
668 	 */
669 	Ilen = Slen + Plen;
670 	I = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(Ilen);
671 	if (I == NULL) {
672 		rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
673 		goto cleanup;
674 	}
675 
676 	S = I;
677 	P = I + Slen;
678 
679 	/*
680 	 * Step 1.
681 	 * We are only interested in deriving keys for encrypt/decrypt
682 	 * for now, so construct the "D"iversifier accordingly.
683 	 */
684 	(void) memset(D, PBE_ID_ENCRYPT, Dlen);
685 
686 	/*
687 	 * Step 2.
688 	 * Concatenate copies of the salt together to make S.
689 	 */
690 	for (i = 0; i < Slen; i += params->ulSaltLen) {
691 		(void) memcpy(S+i, params->pSalt,
692 		    ((Slen - i) > params->ulSaltLen ?
693 		    params->ulSaltLen : (Slen - i)));
694 	}
695 
696 	/*
697 	 * Step 3.
698 	 * Concatenate copies of the password together to make
699 	 * a string P.
700 	 */
701 	for (i = 0; i < Plen; i += params->ulPasswordLen) {
702 		(void) memcpy(P+i, params->pPassword,
703 		    ((Plen - i) > params->ulPasswordLen ?
704 		    params->ulPasswordLen : (Plen - i)));
705 	}
706 
707 	/*
708 	 * Step 4.
709 	 * I = S+P - this is now done because S and P are
710 	 * pointers into I.
711 	 *
712 	 * Step 5.
713 	 * c= CEIL[n/u]
714 	 * where n = pseudorandom bits of output desired.
715 	 */
716 	c = PBE_CEIL(keysize, hashSize);
717 
718 	/*
719 	 * Step 6.
720 	 */
721 	Alen = c * hashSize;
722 	A = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(Alen);
723 	if (A == NULL) {
724 		rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
725 		goto cleanup;
726 	}
727 	AiLen = hashSize;
728 	Ai = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(AiLen);
729 	if (Ai == NULL) {
730 		rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
731 		goto cleanup;
732 	}
733 
734 	/*
735 	 * Step 6a.
736 	 * Ai = Hr(D+I)
737 	 */
738 	for (i = 0; i < c; i++) {
739 		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
740 
741 		if (session_p->sign.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE) {
742 			(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
743 			rv = CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
744 			goto cleanup;
745 		}
746 		session_p->sign.flags |= CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
747 		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
748 
749 		for (j = 0; j < params->ulIteration; j++) {
750 			rv = soft_digest_init(session_p, &digest_mech);
751 			if (rv != CKR_OK)
752 				goto digest_done;
753 
754 			if (j == 0) {
755 				rv = soft_digest_update(session_p, D, Dlen);
756 				if (rv != CKR_OK)
757 					goto digest_done;
758 
759 				rv = soft_digest_update(session_p, I, Ilen);
760 			} else {
761 				rv = soft_digest_update(session_p, Ai, AiLen);
762 			}
763 			if (rv != CKR_OK)
764 				goto digest_done;
765 
766 			rv = soft_digest_final(session_p, Ai, &AiLen);
767 			if (rv != CKR_OK)
768 				goto digest_done;
769 		}
770 digest_done:
771 		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
772 		session_p->sign.flags &= ~CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
773 		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
774 
775 		if (rv != CKR_OK)
776 			goto cleanup;
777 		/*
778 		 * Step 6b.
779 		 * Concatenate Ai to make B
780 		 */
781 		for (j = 0; j < Blen; j += hashSize) {
782 			(void) memcpy(B+j, Ai, ((Blen - j > hashSize) ?
783 			    hashSize : Blen - j));
784 		}
785 
786 		/*
787 		 * Step 6c.
788 		 */
789 		k = Ilen / Blen;
790 		for (j = 0; j < k; j++) {
791 			uchar_t idx;
792 			CK_ULONG m, q = 1, cbit = 0;
793 
794 			for (m = Blen - 1; m >= (CK_ULONG)0; m--, q = 0) {
795 				idx = m + j*Blen;
796 
797 				q += (CK_ULONG)I[idx] + (CK_ULONG)B[m];
798 				q += cbit;
799 				I[idx] = (CK_BYTE)(q & 0xff);
800 				cbit = (q > 0xff);
801 			}
802 		}
803 
804 		/*
805 		 * Step 7.
806 		 *  A += Ai
807 		 */
808 		(void) memcpy(A + i*hashSize, Ai, AiLen);
809 	}
810 
811 	/*
812 	 * Step 8.
813 	 * The final output of this process is the A buffer
814 	 */
815 	(void) memcpy(keybuf, A, keysize);
816 
817 cleanup:
818 	freezero(A, Alen);
819 	freezero(Ai, AiLen);
820 	freezero(B, Blen);
821 	freezero(D, Dlen);
822 	freezero(I, Ilen);
823 	return (rv);
824 }
825 
826 CK_RV
827 soft_derivekey(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
828     soft_object_t *basekey_p, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
829     CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
830 {
831 
832 	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
833 	soft_object_t *secret_key;
834 	CK_MECHANISM digest_mech;
835 	CK_BYTE hash[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* space enough for all mechs */
836 	CK_ULONG hash_len = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
837 	CK_ULONG secret_key_len;
838 	CK_ULONG hash_size;
839 
840 	switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
841 	case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE:
842 		/*
843 		 * Create a new object for secret key. The key type should
844 		 * be provided in the template.
845 		 */
846 		rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pTemplate, ulAttributeCount,
847 		    &secret_key, session_p, CKO_SECRET_KEY, (CK_KEY_TYPE)~0UL,
848 		    0, SOFT_DERIVE_KEY_DH, B_FALSE);
849 
850 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
851 			return (rv);
852 		}
853 
854 		rv = soft_dh_key_derive(basekey_p, secret_key,
855 		    (CK_BYTE *)pMechanism->pParameter,
856 		    pMechanism->ulParameterLen);
857 
858 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
859 			if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
860 				soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
861 				    B_FALSE);
862 			else
863 				soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
864 				    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
865 			return (rv);
866 		}
867 
868 		break;
869 
870 	case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
871 		/*
872 		 * Create a new object for secret key. The key type should
873 		 * be provided in the template.
874 		 */
875 		rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pTemplate, ulAttributeCount,
876 		    &secret_key, session_p, CKO_SECRET_KEY, (CK_KEY_TYPE)~0UL,
877 		    0, SOFT_DERIVE_KEY_DH, B_FALSE);
878 
879 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
880 			return (rv);
881 		}
882 
883 		rv = soft_ec_key_derive(basekey_p, secret_key,
884 		    (CK_BYTE *)pMechanism->pParameter,
885 		    pMechanism->ulParameterLen);
886 
887 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
888 			if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
889 				soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
890 				    B_FALSE);
891 			else
892 				soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
893 				    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
894 			return (rv);
895 		}
896 
897 		break;
898 
899 	case CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION:
900 		hash_size = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
901 		digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA_1;
902 		goto common;
903 
904 	case CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION:
905 		hash_size = MD5_HASH_SIZE;
906 		digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_MD5;
907 		goto common;
908 
909 	case CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION:
910 		hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
911 		digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA256;
912 		goto common;
913 
914 	case CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION:
915 		hash_size = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
916 		digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA384;
917 		goto common;
918 
919 	case CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION:
920 		hash_size = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
921 		digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA512;
922 		goto common;
923 
924 	case CKM_SHA512_224_KEY_DERIVATION:
925 		hash_size = SHA512_224_DIGEST_LENGTH;
926 		digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA512_224;
927 		goto common;
928 
929 	case CKM_SHA512_256_KEY_DERIVATION:
930 		hash_size = SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
931 		digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA512_256;
932 		goto common;
933 
934 common:
935 		/*
936 		 * Create a new object for secret key. The key type is optional
937 		 * to be provided in the template. If it is not specified in
938 		 * the template, the default is CKK_GENERIC_SECRET.
939 		 */
940 		rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pTemplate, ulAttributeCount,
941 		    &secret_key, session_p, CKO_SECRET_KEY,
942 		    (CK_KEY_TYPE)CKK_GENERIC_SECRET, 0,
943 		    SOFT_DERIVE_KEY_OTHER, B_FALSE);
944 
945 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
946 			return (rv);
947 		}
948 
949 		*phKey = secret_key->handle;
950 
951 		/* Validate the key type and key length */
952 		rv = soft_key_derive_check_length(secret_key, hash_size);
953 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
954 			if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
955 				soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
956 				    B_FALSE);
957 			else
958 				soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
959 				    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
960 			return (rv);
961 		}
962 
963 		/*
964 		 * Derive the secret key by digesting the value of another
965 		 * secret key (base key) with SHA-1 or MD5.
966 		 */
967 		rv = soft_digest_init_internal(session_p, &digest_mech);
968 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
969 			if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
970 				soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
971 				    B_FALSE);
972 			else
973 				soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
974 				    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
975 			return (rv);
976 		}
977 
978 		rv = soft_digest(session_p, OBJ_SEC_VALUE(basekey_p),
979 		    OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(basekey_p), hash, &hash_len);
980 
981 		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
982 		/* soft_digest_common() has freed the digest context */
983 		session_p->digest.flags = 0;
984 		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
985 
986 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
987 			if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
988 				soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
989 				    B_FALSE);
990 			else
991 				soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
992 				    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
993 			return (rv);
994 		}
995 
996 		secret_key_len = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key);
997 
998 		if ((OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key) = malloc(secret_key_len)) ==
999 		    NULL) {
1000 			if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
1001 				soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
1002 				    B_FALSE);
1003 			else
1004 				soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
1005 				    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
1006 			return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
1007 		}
1008 
1009 		/*
1010 		 * The key produced by this mechanism will be of the
1011 		 * specified type and length.
1012 		 * The truncation removes extra bytes from the leading
1013 		 * of the digested key value.
1014 		 */
1015 		(void) memcpy(OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key),
1016 		    (hash + hash_len - secret_key_len),
1017 		    secret_key_len);
1018 
1019 		break;
1020 
1021 	/*
1022 	 * The key sensitivity and extractability rules for the generated
1023 	 * keys will be enforced inside soft_ssl_master_key_derive() and
1024 	 * soft_ssl_key_and_mac_derive()
1025 	 */
1026 	case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
1027 	case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
1028 	case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
1029 	case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
1030 		if (phKey == NULL_PTR)
1031 			return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
1032 		return (soft_ssl_master_key_derive(session_p, pMechanism,
1033 		    basekey_p, pTemplate, ulAttributeCount, phKey));
1034 
1035 	case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
1036 	case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
1037 		return (soft_ssl_key_and_mac_derive(session_p, pMechanism,
1038 		    basekey_p, pTemplate, ulAttributeCount));
1039 
1040 	case CKM_TLS_PRF:
1041 		if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
1042 		    pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof (CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS) ||
1043 		    phKey != NULL)
1044 			return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
1045 
1046 		if (pTemplate != NULL)
1047 			return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT);
1048 
1049 		return (derive_tls_prf(
1050 		    (CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR)pMechanism->pParameter, basekey_p));
1051 
1052 	default:
1053 		return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
1054 	}
1055 
1056 	soft_derive_enforce_flags(basekey_p, secret_key);
1057 
1058 	if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key)) {
1059 		/*
1060 		 * All the info has been filled, so we can write to
1061 		 * keystore now.
1062 		 */
1063 		rv = soft_put_object_to_keystore(secret_key);
1064 		if (rv != CKR_OK)
1065 			soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
1066 	}
1067 
1068 	return (rv);
1069 }
1070 
1071 
1072 /*
1073  * Perform key derivation rules on key's sensitivity and extractability.
1074  */
1075 void
1076 soft_derive_enforce_flags(soft_object_t *basekey, soft_object_t *newkey)
1077 {
1078 
1079 	boolean_t new_sensitive = B_FALSE;
1080 	boolean_t new_extractable = B_FALSE;
1081 
1082 	/*
1083 	 * The sensitive and extractable bits have been set when
1084 	 * the newkey was built.
1085 	 */
1086 	if (newkey->bool_attr_mask & SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON) {
1087 		new_sensitive = B_TRUE;
1088 	}
1089 
1090 	if (newkey->bool_attr_mask & EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON) {
1091 		new_extractable = B_TRUE;
1092 	}
1093 
1094 	/* Derive the CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE flag */
1095 	if (!basekey->bool_attr_mask & ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON) {
1096 		/*
1097 		 * If the base key has its CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE set to
1098 		 * FALSE, then the derived key will as well.
1099 		 */
1100 		newkey->bool_attr_mask &= ~ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON;
1101 	} else {
1102 		/*
1103 		 * If the base key has its CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE set to TRUE,
1104 		 * then the derived key has the CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE set to
1105 		 * the same value as its CKA_SENSITIVE;
1106 		 */
1107 		if (new_sensitive) {
1108 			newkey->bool_attr_mask |= ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON;
1109 		} else {
1110 			newkey->bool_attr_mask &= ~ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON;
1111 		}
1112 	}
1113 
1114 	/* Derive the CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE flag */
1115 	if (!basekey->bool_attr_mask & NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON) {
1116 		/*
1117 		 * If the base key has its CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE set to
1118 		 * FALSE, then the derived key will as well.
1119 		 */
1120 		newkey->bool_attr_mask &= ~NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON;
1121 	} else {
1122 		/*
1123 		 * If the base key has its CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE set to TRUE,
1124 		 * then the derived key has the CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE set to
1125 		 * the opposite value from its CKA_EXTRACTABLE;
1126 		 */
1127 		if (new_extractable) {
1128 			newkey->bool_attr_mask &= ~NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON;
1129 		} else {
1130 			newkey->bool_attr_mask |= NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON;
1131 		}
1132 	}
1133 
1134 	/* Set the CKA_LOCAL flag to false */
1135 	newkey->bool_attr_mask &= ~LOCAL_BOOL_ON;
1136 }
1137 
1138 
1139 /*
1140  * do_prf
1141  *
1142  * This routine implements Step 3. of the PBKDF2 function
1143  * defined in PKCS#5 for generating derived keys from a
1144  * password.
1145  *
1146  * Currently, PRF is always SHA_1_HMAC.
1147  */
1148 static CK_RV
1149 do_prf(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR params,
1150     soft_object_t *hmac_key, CK_BYTE *newsalt, CK_ULONG saltlen,
1151     CK_BYTE *blockdata, CK_ULONG blocklen)
1152 {
1153 	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
1154 	CK_MECHANISM digest_mech = {CKM_SHA_1_HMAC, NULL, 0};
1155 	CK_BYTE buffer[2][SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
1156 	CK_ULONG hmac_outlen = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
1157 	CK_ULONG inlen;
1158 	CK_BYTE *input, *output;
1159 	CK_ULONG i, j;
1160 
1161 	input = newsalt;
1162 	inlen = saltlen;
1163 
1164 	output = buffer[1];
1165 	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
1166 
1167 	if (session_p->sign.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE) {
1168 		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
1169 		return (CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE);
1170 	}
1171 	session_p->sign.flags |= CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
1172 	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
1173 
1174 	for (i = 0; i < params->iterations; i++) {
1175 		/*
1176 		 * The key doesn't change, its always the
1177 		 * password iniitally given.
1178 		 */
1179 		rv = soft_sign_init(session_p, &digest_mech, hmac_key);
1180 
1181 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
1182 			goto cleanup;
1183 		}
1184 
1185 		/* Call PRF function (SHA1_HMAC for now). */
1186 		rv = soft_sign(session_p, input, inlen, output, &hmac_outlen);
1187 
1188 		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
1189 			goto cleanup;
1190 		}
1191 		/*
1192 		 * The first time, initialize the output buffer
1193 		 * with the HMAC signature.
1194 		 */
1195 		if (i == 0) {
1196 			(void) memcpy(blockdata, output,
1197 			    local_min(blocklen, hmac_outlen));
1198 		} else {
1199 			/*
1200 			 * XOR the existing data with output from PRF.
1201 			 *
1202 			 * Only XOR up to the length of the blockdata,
1203 			 * it may be less than a full hmac buffer when
1204 			 * the final block is being computed.
1205 			 */
1206 			for (j = 0; j < hmac_outlen && j < blocklen; j++)
1207 				blockdata[j] ^= output[j];
1208 		}
1209 		/* Output from previous PRF is input for next round */
1210 		input = output;
1211 		inlen = hmac_outlen;
1212 
1213 		/*
1214 		 * Switch buffers to avoid overuse of memcpy.
1215 		 * Initially we used buffer[1], so after the end of
1216 		 * the first iteration (i==0), we switch to buffer[0]
1217 		 * and continue swapping with each iteration.
1218 		 */
1219 		output = buffer[i%2];
1220 	}
1221 cleanup:
1222 	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
1223 	session_p->sign.flags &= ~CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
1224 	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
1225 
1226 	return (rv);
1227 }
1228 
1229 static CK_RV
1230 soft_create_hmac_key(soft_session_t *session_p,  CK_BYTE *passwd,
1231     CK_ULONG passwd_len, soft_object_t **keyp)
1232 {
1233 	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
1234 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
1235 	CK_KEY_TYPE keytype = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
1236 	CK_BBOOL True = TRUE;
1237 	CK_ATTRIBUTE keytemplate[4];
1238 
1239 	/*
1240 	 * We must initialize each template member individually
1241 	 * because at the time of initial coding for ON10, the
1242 	 * compiler was using the "-xc99=%none" option
1243 	 * which prevents us from being able to declare the whole
1244 	 * template in place as usual.
1245 	 */
1246 	keytemplate[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
1247 	keytemplate[0].pValue = &keyclass;
1248 	keytemplate[0].ulValueLen =  sizeof (keyclass);
1249 
1250 	keytemplate[1].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
1251 	keytemplate[1].pValue = &keytype;
1252 	keytemplate[1].ulValueLen =  sizeof (keytype);
1253 
1254 	keytemplate[2].type = CKA_SIGN;
1255 	keytemplate[2].pValue = &True;
1256 	keytemplate[2].ulValueLen =  sizeof (True);
1257 
1258 	keytemplate[3].type = CKA_VALUE;
1259 	keytemplate[3].pValue = passwd;
1260 	keytemplate[3].ulValueLen = passwd_len;
1261 	/*
1262 	 * Create a generic key object to be used for HMAC operations.
1263 	 * The "value" for this key is the password from the
1264 	 * mechanism parameter structure.
1265 	 */
1266 	rv = soft_gen_keyobject(keytemplate,
1267 	    sizeof (keytemplate)/sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE), keyp, session_p,
1268 	    CKO_SECRET_KEY, (CK_KEY_TYPE)CKK_GENERIC_SECRET, 0,
1269 	    SOFT_CREATE_OBJ, B_TRUE);
1270 
1271 	return (rv);
1272 }
1273 
1274 CK_RV
1275 soft_generate_pkcs5_pbkdf2_key(soft_session_t *session_p,
1276     CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, soft_object_t *secret_key)
1277 {
1278 	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
1279 	CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS	*params =
1280 	    (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
1281 	CK_ULONG hLen = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
1282 	CK_ULONG dkLen, i;
1283 	CK_ULONG blocks, remainder;
1284 	soft_object_t *hmac_key = NULL;
1285 	CK_BYTE *salt = NULL;
1286 	CK_BYTE *keydata = NULL;
1287 
1288 	params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR) pMechanism->pParameter;
1289 
1290 	if (params->prf != CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1)
1291 		return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
1292 
1293 	if (params->pPrfData != NULL || params->ulPrfDataLen != 0)
1294 		return (CKR_DATA_INVALID);
1295 
1296 	if (params->saltSource != CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED ||
1297 	    params->iterations == 0)
1298 		return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
1299 
1300 	/*
1301 	 * Create a key object to use for HMAC operations.
1302 	 */
1303 	rv = soft_create_hmac_key(session_p, params->pPassword,
1304 	    *params->ulPasswordLen, &hmac_key);
1305 
1306 	if (rv != CKR_OK)
1307 		return (rv);
1308 
1309 	/* Step 1. */
1310 	dkLen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key);  /* length of desired key */
1311 
1312 	if (dkLen > ((((u_longlong_t)1)<<32)-1)*hLen) {
1313 		(void) soft_delete_object(session_p, hmac_key, B_FALSE,
1314 		    B_FALSE);
1315 		return (CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE);
1316 	}
1317 
1318 	/* Step 2. */
1319 	blocks = dkLen / hLen;
1320 
1321 	/* crude "Ceiling" function to adjust the number of blocks to use */
1322 	if (blocks * hLen != dkLen)
1323 		blocks++;
1324 
1325 	remainder = dkLen - ((blocks - 1) * hLen);
1326 
1327 	/* Step 3 */
1328 	salt = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(params->ulSaltSourceDataLen + 4);
1329 	if (salt == NULL) {
1330 		(void) soft_delete_object(session_p, hmac_key, B_FALSE,
1331 		    B_FALSE);
1332 		return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
1333 	}
1334 	/*
1335 	 * Nothing in PKCS#5 says you cannot pass an empty
1336 	 * salt, so we will allow for this and not return error
1337 	 * if the salt is not specified.
1338 	 */
1339 	if (params->pSaltSourceData != NULL && params->ulSaltSourceDataLen > 0)
1340 		(void) memcpy(salt, params->pSaltSourceData,
1341 		    params->ulSaltSourceDataLen);
1342 
1343 	/*
1344 	 * Get pointer to the data section of the key,
1345 	 * this will be used below as output from the
1346 	 * PRF iteration/concatenations so that when the
1347 	 * blocks are all iterated, the secret_key will
1348 	 * have the resulting derived key value.
1349 	 */
1350 	keydata = (CK_BYTE *)OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key);
1351 
1352 	/* Step 4. */
1353 	for (i = 0; i < blocks && (rv == CKR_OK); i++) {
1354 		CK_BYTE *s;
1355 
1356 		s = salt + params->ulSaltSourceDataLen;
1357 
1358 		/*
1359 		 * Append the block index to the salt as input
1360 		 * to the PRF.  Block index should start at 1
1361 		 * not 0.
1362 		 */
1363 		*s++ = ((i+1) >> 24) & 0xff;
1364 		*s++ = ((i+1) >> 16) & 0xff;
1365 		*s++ = ((i+1) >> 8) & 0xff;
1366 		*s   = ((i+1)) & 0xff;
1367 
1368 		/*
1369 		 * Adjust the key pointer so we always append the
1370 		 * PRF output to the current key.
1371 		 */
1372 		rv = do_prf(session_p, params, hmac_key,
1373 		    salt, params->ulSaltSourceDataLen + 4, keydata,
1374 		    ((i + 1) == blocks ? remainder : hLen));
1375 
1376 		keydata += hLen;
1377 	}
1378 	(void) soft_delete_object(session_p, hmac_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
1379 	freezero(salt, params->ulSaltSourceDataLen);
1380 
1381 	return (rv);
1382 }
1383 
1384 CK_RV
1385 soft_wrapkey(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
1386     soft_object_t *wrappingKey_p, soft_object_t *hkey_p,
1387     CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen)
1388 {
1389 	CK_RV		rv = CKR_OK;
1390 	CK_ULONG	plain_len = 0;
1391 	CK_BYTE_PTR	plain_data = NULL;
1392 	CK_ULONG	padded_len = 0;
1393 	CK_BYTE_PTR	padded_data = NULL;
1394 	CK_ULONG	wkey_blksz = 1;		/* so modulo will work right */
1395 
1396 	/* Check if the mechanism is supported. */
1397 	switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
1398 	case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
1399 	case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
1400 	case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
1401 		/*
1402 		 * Secret key mechs with padding can be used to wrap secret
1403 		 * keys and private keys only.  See PKCS#11, * sec 11.14,
1404 		 * C_WrapKey and secs 12.* for each mechanism's wrapping/
1405 		 * unwrapping constraints.
1406 		 */
1407 		if (hkey_p->class != CKO_SECRET_KEY && hkey_p->class !=
1408 		    CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)
1409 			return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
1410 		break;
1411 	case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
1412 	case CKM_RSA_X_509:
1413 	case CKM_DES_ECB:
1414 	case CKM_DES3_ECB:
1415 	case CKM_AES_ECB:
1416 	case CKM_DES_CBC:
1417 	case CKM_DES3_CBC:
1418 	case CKM_AES_CBC:
1419 	case CKM_AES_CTR:
1420 	case CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC:
1421 		/*
1422 		 * Unpadded secret key mechs and private key mechs are only
1423 		 * defined for wrapping secret keys.  See PKCS#11 refs above.
1424 		 */
1425 		if (hkey_p->class != CKO_SECRET_KEY)
1426 			return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
1427 		break;
1428 	default:
1429 		return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
1430 	}
1431 
1432 	if (hkey_p->class == CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
1433 		plain_data = OBJ_SEC_VALUE(hkey_p);
1434 		plain_len = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(hkey_p);
1435 	} else {
1436 		/*
1437 		 * BER-encode the object to be wrapped:  call first with
1438 		 * plain_data = NULL to get the size needed, allocate that
1439 		 * much space, call again to fill space with actual data.
1440 		 */
1441 		rv = soft_object_to_asn1(hkey_p, NULL, &plain_len);
1442 		if (rv != CKR_OK)
1443 			return (rv);
1444 		if ((plain_data = malloc(plain_len)) == NULL)
1445 			return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
1446 		(void) memset(plain_data, 0x0, plain_len);
1447 		rv = soft_object_to_asn1(hkey_p, plain_data, &plain_len);
1448 		if (rv != CKR_OK)
1449 			goto cleanup_wrap;
1450 	}
1451 
1452 	/*
1453 	 * For unpadded ECB and CBC mechanisms, the object needs to be
1454 	 * padded to the wrapping key's blocksize prior to the encryption.
1455 	 */
1456 	padded_len = plain_len;
1457 	padded_data = plain_data;
1458 
1459 	switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
1460 	case CKM_DES_ECB:
1461 	case CKM_DES3_ECB:
1462 	case CKM_AES_ECB:
1463 	case CKM_DES_CBC:
1464 	case CKM_DES3_CBC:
1465 	case CKM_AES_CBC:
1466 	case CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC:
1467 		/* Find the block size of the wrapping key. */
1468 		if (wrappingKey_p->class == CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
1469 			switch (wrappingKey_p->key_type) {
1470 			case CKK_DES:
1471 			case CKK_DES2:
1472 			case CKK_DES3:
1473 				wkey_blksz = DES_BLOCK_LEN;
1474 				break;
1475 			case CKK_AES:
1476 				wkey_blksz = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
1477 				break;
1478 			case CKK_BLOWFISH:
1479 				wkey_blksz = BLOWFISH_BLOCK_LEN;
1480 				break;
1481 			default:
1482 				break;
1483 			}
1484 		} else {
1485 			rv = CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
1486 			goto cleanup_wrap;
1487 		}
1488 
1489 		/* Extend the plain text data to block size boundary.  */
1490 		if ((padded_len % wkey_blksz) != 0) {
1491 			padded_len += (wkey_blksz - (plain_len % wkey_blksz));
1492 			if ((padded_data = malloc(padded_len)) == NULL) {
1493 				rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
1494 				goto cleanup_wrap;
1495 			}
1496 			(void) memset(padded_data, 0x0, padded_len);
1497 			(void) memcpy(padded_data, plain_data, plain_len);
1498 		}
1499 		break;
1500 	default:
1501 		break;
1502 	}
1503 
1504 	rv = soft_encrypt_init(session_p, pMechanism, wrappingKey_p);
1505 	if (rv != CKR_OK)
1506 		goto cleanup_wrap;
1507 
1508 	rv = soft_encrypt(session_p, padded_data, padded_len,
1509 	    pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
1510 
1511 cleanup_wrap:
1512 	if (padded_data != NULL && padded_len != plain_len) {
1513 		/* Clear buffer before returning to memory pool. */
1514 		freezero(padded_data, padded_len);
1515 	}
1516 
1517 	if ((hkey_p->class != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (plain_data != NULL)) {
1518 		/* Clear buffer before returning to memory pool. */
1519 		freezero(plain_data, plain_len);
1520 	}
1521 
1522 	return (rv);
1523 }
1524 
1525 /*
1526  * Quick check for whether unwrapped key length is appropriate for key type
1527  * and whether it needs to be truncated (in case the wrapping function had
1528  * to pad the key prior to wrapping).
1529  */
1530 static CK_RV
1531 soft_unwrap_secret_len_check(CK_KEY_TYPE keytype, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechtype,
1532     CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount)
1533 {
1534 	CK_ULONG	i;
1535 	boolean_t	isValueLen = B_FALSE;
1536 
1537 	/*
1538 	 * Based on the key type and the mech used to unwrap, need to
1539 	 * determine if CKA_VALUE_LEN should or should not be specified.
1540 	 * PKCS#11 v2.11 restricts CKA_VALUE_LEN from being specified
1541 	 * for C_UnwrapKey for all mechs and key types, but v2.20 loosens
1542 	 * that restriction, perhaps because it makes it impossible to
1543 	 * determine the original length of unwrapped variable-length secret
1544 	 * keys, such as RC4, AES, and GENERIC_SECRET.  These variable-length
1545 	 * secret keys would have been padded with trailing null-bytes so
1546 	 * that they could be successfully wrapped with *_ECB and *_CBC
1547 	 * mechanisms.  Hence for unwrapping with these mechs, CKA_VALUE_LEN
1548 	 * must be specified.  For unwrapping with other mechs, such as
1549 	 * *_CBC_PAD, the CKA_VALUE_LEN is not needed.
1550 	 */
1551 
1552 	/* Find out if template has CKA_VALUE_LEN. */
1553 	for (i = 0; i < ulAttributeCount; i++) {
1554 		if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN &&
1555 		    pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) {
1556 			isValueLen = B_TRUE;
1557 			break;
1558 		}
1559 	}
1560 
1561 	/* Does its presence  conflict with the mech type and key type? */
1562 	switch (mechtype) {
1563 	case CKM_DES_ECB:
1564 	case CKM_DES3_ECB:
1565 	case CKM_AES_ECB:
1566 	case CKM_DES_CBC:
1567 	case CKM_DES3_CBC:
1568 	case CKM_AES_CBC:
1569 	case CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC:
1570 		/*
1571 		 * CKA_VALUE_LEN must be specified
1572 		 * if keytype is CKK_RC4, CKK_AES and CKK_GENERIC_SECRET
1573 		 * and must not be specified otherwise
1574 		 */
1575 		switch (keytype) {
1576 		case CKK_DES:
1577 		case CKK_DES2:
1578 		case CKK_DES3:
1579 			if (isValueLen)
1580 				return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT);
1581 			break;
1582 		case CKK_GENERIC_SECRET:
1583 		case CKK_RC4:
1584 		case CKK_AES:
1585 		case CKK_BLOWFISH:
1586 			if (!isValueLen)
1587 				return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
1588 			break;
1589 		default:
1590 			return (CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1591 		}
1592 		break;
1593 	default:
1594 		/* CKA_VALUE_LEN must not be specified */
1595 		if (isValueLen)
1596 			return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT);
1597 		break;
1598 	}
1599 
1600 	return (CKR_OK);
1601 }
1602 
1603 CK_RV
1604 soft_unwrapkey(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
1605     soft_object_t *unwrappingkey_p, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
1606     CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
1607     CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
1608 {
1609 	CK_RV			rv = CKR_OK;
1610 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		new_obj_class = ~0UL;
1611 	int			i = 0;
1612 	soft_object_t		*new_objp = NULL;
1613 	boolean_t		persistent = B_FALSE;
1614 	CK_BYTE_PTR		plain_data = NULL;
1615 	CK_ULONG		plain_len = 0;
1616 	secret_key_obj_t	*sck = NULL;
1617 
1618 	/* Scan the attribute template for the object class. */
1619 	if (pTemplate != NULL && ulAttributeCount != 0) {
1620 		for (i = 0; i < ulAttributeCount; i++) {
1621 			if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
1622 				new_obj_class =
1623 				    *((CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue);
1624 				break;
1625 			}
1626 		}
1627 		if (new_obj_class == ~0UL)
1628 			return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
1629 	}
1630 
1631 	/*
1632 	 * Check if the mechanism is supported, and now that the new
1633 	 * object's class is known, the mechanism selected should be
1634 	 * capable of doing the unwrap.
1635 	 */
1636 	switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
1637 	case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
1638 	case CKM_RSA_X_509:
1639 	case CKM_DES_ECB:
1640 	case CKM_DES3_ECB:
1641 	case CKM_AES_ECB:
1642 	case CKM_DES_CBC:
1643 	case CKM_DES3_CBC:
1644 	case CKM_AES_CBC:
1645 	case CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC:
1646 		if (new_obj_class != CKO_SECRET_KEY)
1647 			return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
1648 		break;
1649 	case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
1650 	case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
1651 	case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
1652 		if (new_obj_class != CKO_SECRET_KEY && new_obj_class !=
1653 		    CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)
1654 			return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
1655 		break;
1656 	default:
1657 		return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
1658 	}
1659 
1660 	/* Create a new object based on the attribute template. */
1661 	rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pTemplate, ulAttributeCount,
1662 	    &new_objp, session_p, (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)~0UL,
1663 	    (CK_KEY_TYPE)~0UL, 0, SOFT_UNWRAP_KEY, B_FALSE);
1664 	if (rv != CKR_OK)
1665 		return (rv);
1666 
1667 	/*
1668 	 * New key will have CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE and CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE
1669 	 * both set to FALSE.  CKA_EXTRACTABLE will be set _by_default_ to
1670 	 * true -- leaving the possibility that it may be set FALSE by the
1671 	 * supplied attribute template.  If the precise template cannot be
1672 	 * supported, unwrap fails.  PKCS#11 spec, Sec. 11.14, C_UnwrapKey.
1673 	 *
1674 	 * Therefore, check the new object's NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON and
1675 	 * ALWAYS_SENSITVE_BOOL_ON; if they are TRUE, the template must
1676 	 * have supplied them and therefore we cannot honor the unwrap.
1677 	 */
1678 	if ((new_objp->bool_attr_mask & NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON) ||
1679 	    (new_objp->bool_attr_mask & ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON)) {
1680 		rv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
1681 		goto cleanup_unwrap;
1682 	}
1683 
1684 	rv = soft_decrypt_init(session_p, pMechanism, unwrappingkey_p);
1685 	if (rv != CKR_OK)
1686 		goto cleanup_unwrap;
1687 
1688 	/* First get the length of the plain data */
1689 	rv = soft_decrypt(session_p, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, NULL,
1690 	    &plain_len);
1691 	if (rv != CKR_OK)
1692 		goto cleanup_unwrap;
1693 
1694 	/* Allocate space for the unwrapped data */
1695 	if ((plain_data = malloc(plain_len)) == NULL) {
1696 		rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
1697 		goto cleanup_unwrap;
1698 	}
1699 	(void) memset(plain_data, 0x0, plain_len);
1700 
1701 	/* Perform actual decryption into the allocated space. */
1702 	rv = soft_decrypt(session_p, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, plain_data,
1703 	    &plain_len);
1704 	if (rv != CKR_OK)
1705 		goto cleanup_unwrap;
1706 
1707 	if (new_objp->class == CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
1708 		/*
1709 		 * Since no ASN.1 encoding is done for secret keys, check for
1710 		 * appropriateness and copy decrypted buffer to the key object.
1711 		 */
1712 
1713 		/* Check keytype and mechtype don't conflict with valuelen */
1714 		rv = soft_unwrap_secret_len_check(new_objp->key_type,
1715 		    pMechanism->mechanism, pTemplate, ulAttributeCount);
1716 		if (rv != CKR_OK)
1717 			goto cleanup_unwrap;
1718 
1719 		/*
1720 		 * Allocate the secret key structure if not already there;
1721 		 * it will exist for variable length keys since CKA_VALUE_LEN
1722 		 * is specified and saved, but not for fixed length keys.
1723 		 */
1724 		if (OBJ_SEC(new_objp) == NULL) {
1725 			if ((sck = calloc(1, sizeof (secret_key_obj_t))) ==
1726 			    NULL) {
1727 				rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
1728 				goto cleanup_unwrap;
1729 			}
1730 			OBJ_SEC(new_objp) = sck;
1731 		}
1732 
1733 		switch (new_objp->key_type) {
1734 		/* Fixed length secret keys don't have CKA_VALUE_LEN */
1735 		case CKK_DES:
1736 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) = DES_KEYSIZE;
1737 			break;
1738 		case CKK_DES2:
1739 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) = DES2_KEYSIZE;
1740 			break;
1741 		case CKK_DES3:
1742 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) = DES3_KEYSIZE;
1743 			break;
1744 
1745 		/*
1746 		 * Variable length secret keys.  CKA_VALUE_LEN must be
1747 		 * provided by the template when mech is *_ECB or *_CBC, and
1748 		 * should already have been set during soft_gen_keyobject().
1749 		 * Otherwise we don't need CKA_VALUE_LEN.
1750 		 */
1751 		case CKK_GENERIC_SECRET:
1752 		case CKK_RC4:
1753 		case CKK_AES:
1754 		case CKK_BLOWFISH:
1755 			break;
1756 		default:
1757 			rv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID;
1758 			goto cleanup_unwrap;
1759 		};
1760 
1761 		if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) == 0) {
1762 			/* No CKA_VALUE_LEN set so set it now and save data */
1763 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) = plain_len;
1764 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE(new_objp) = plain_data;
1765 		} else if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) == plain_len) {
1766 			/* No need to truncate, just save the data */
1767 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE(new_objp) = plain_data;
1768 		} else if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) > plain_len) {
1769 			/* Length can't be bigger than what was decrypted */
1770 			rv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE;
1771 			goto cleanup_unwrap;
1772 		} else {	/* betw 0 and plain_len, hence padded */
1773 			/* Truncate the data before saving. */
1774 			OBJ_SEC_VALUE(new_objp) = realloc(plain_data,
1775 			    OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp));
1776 			if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE(new_objp) == NULL) {
1777 				rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
1778 				goto cleanup_unwrap;
1779 			}
1780 		}
1781 	} else {
1782 		/* BER-decode the object to be unwrapped. */
1783 		rv = soft_asn1_to_object(new_objp, plain_data, plain_len);
1784 		if (rv != CKR_OK)
1785 			goto cleanup_unwrap;
1786 	}
1787 
1788 	/* If it needs to be persistent, write it to the keystore */
1789 	if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(new_objp)) {
1790 		persistent = B_TRUE;
1791 		rv = soft_put_object_to_keystore(new_objp);
1792 		if (rv != CKR_OK)
1793 			goto cleanup_unwrap;
1794 	}
1795 
1796 	if (new_objp->class != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
1797 		/* Clear buffer before returning to memory pool. */
1798 		freezero(plain_data, plain_len);
1799 	}
1800 
1801 	*phKey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)new_objp;
1802 
1803 	return (CKR_OK);
1804 
1805 cleanup_unwrap:
1806 	/* The decrypted private key buffer must be freed explicitly. */
1807 	if ((new_objp->class != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (plain_data != NULL)) {
1808 		/* Clear buffer before returning to memory pool. */
1809 		freezero(plain_data, plain_len);
1810 	}
1811 
1812 	/* sck and new_objp are indirectly free()d inside these functions */
1813 	if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(new_objp))
1814 		soft_delete_token_object(new_objp, persistent, B_FALSE);
1815 	else
1816 		soft_delete_object(session_p, new_objp, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
1817 
1818 	return (rv);
1819 }
1820