1 /*
2  * CDDL HEADER START
3  *
4  * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
5  * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only
6  * (the "License").  You may not use this file except in compliance
7  * with the License.
8  *
9  * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
10  * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
11  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
12  * and limitations under the License.
13  *
14  * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
15  * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
16  * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
17  * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
18  * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
19  *
20  * CDDL HEADER END
21  */
22 /*
23  *	context_establish.c
24  *
25  * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
26  * Use is subject to license terms.
27  *
28  */
29 
30 #include <string.h>
31 #include "dh_gssapi.h"
32 
33 /*
34  * The following 2 routines convert a gss_channel_binding to a DH
35  * channel_binding and vis versa.  We can no longer assume a simple
36  * cast because a GSS buffer_t uses a size_t for the length field wich
37  * is 64 bits in a 64 bit process. The xdr encoding always assumes the
38  * length to be 32 bits :<.
39  */
40 
41 static dh_channel_binding_t
GSS2DH_channel_binding(dh_channel_binding_t dh_binding,gss_channel_bindings_t gss_binding)42 GSS2DH_channel_binding(dh_channel_binding_t dh_binding,
43 		    gss_channel_bindings_t gss_binding)
44 {
45 	if (gss_binding == GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS)
46 		return (NULL);
47 
48 	dh_binding->initiator_addrtype = gss_binding->initiator_addrtype;
49 	dh_binding->initiator_address.dh_buffer_desc_len =
50 		(uint32_t)gss_binding->initiator_address.length;
51 	if (gss_binding->initiator_address.length !=
52 		dh_binding->initiator_address.dh_buffer_desc_len)
53 		return (NULL);
54 	dh_binding->initiator_address.dh_buffer_desc_val =
55 		gss_binding->initiator_address.value;
56 	dh_binding->acceptor_addrtype = gss_binding->acceptor_addrtype;
57 	dh_binding->acceptor_address.dh_buffer_desc_len =
58 		(uint32_t)gss_binding->acceptor_address.length;
59 	dh_binding->acceptor_address.dh_buffer_desc_val =
60 		gss_binding->acceptor_address.value;
61 	dh_binding->application_data.dh_buffer_desc_len =
62 		(uint32_t)gss_binding->application_data.length;
63 	dh_binding->application_data.dh_buffer_desc_val =
64 		gss_binding->application_data.value;
65 
66 	return (dh_binding);
67 }
68 
69 static gss_channel_bindings_t
DH2GSS_channel_binding(gss_channel_bindings_t gss_binding,dh_channel_binding_t dh_binding)70 DH2GSS_channel_binding(gss_channel_bindings_t gss_binding,
71 		    dh_channel_binding_t dh_binding)
72 {
73 	if (dh_binding == NULL)
74 		return (GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS);
75 
76 	gss_binding->initiator_addrtype = dh_binding->initiator_addrtype;
77 	gss_binding->initiator_address.length =
78 		dh_binding->initiator_address.dh_buffer_desc_len;
79 	gss_binding->initiator_address.value =
80 		dh_binding->initiator_address.dh_buffer_desc_val;
81 	gss_binding->acceptor_addrtype = dh_binding->acceptor_addrtype;
82 	gss_binding->acceptor_address.length =
83 		dh_binding->acceptor_address.dh_buffer_desc_len;
84 	gss_binding->acceptor_address.value =
85 		dh_binding->acceptor_address.dh_buffer_desc_val;
86 	gss_binding->application_data.length =
87 		dh_binding->application_data.dh_buffer_desc_len;
88 	gss_binding->application_data.value =
89 		dh_binding->application_data.dh_buffer_desc_val;
90 
91 	return (gss_binding);
92 }
93 
94 /*
95  * Routine to compare that two gss_buffers are the same.
96  */
97 static bool_t
gss_buffer_cmp(gss_buffer_t b1,gss_buffer_t b2)98 gss_buffer_cmp(gss_buffer_t b1, gss_buffer_t b2)
99 {
100 	if (b1->length != b2->length)
101 		return (FALSE);
102 	if (b1->length == 0)
103 		return (TRUE);
104 	if (b1->value == b2->value)
105 		return (TRUE);
106 	if (b1->value == 0 || b2->value == 0)
107 		return (FALSE);
108 
109 	return (memcmp(b1->value, b2->value, b1->length) == 0);
110 }
111 
112 /*
113  * Compare if two channel bindings are the same. If the local binding is
114  * NULL then we always return TRUE. This indicates that the local host
115  * does not care about any bindings.
116  */
117 
118 static bool_t
gss_chanbind_cmp(gss_channel_bindings_t local,gss_channel_bindings_t remote)119 gss_chanbind_cmp(gss_channel_bindings_t local, gss_channel_bindings_t remote)
120 {
121 	if (local == NULL)
122 		return (TRUE); /* local doesn't care so we won't either */
123 
124 	if (remote == NULL)
125 		return (FALSE);
126 
127 	if (local->initiator_addrtype != remote->initiator_addrtype)
128 		return (FALSE);
129 
130 	if (local->initiator_addrtype != GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR)
131 		if (gss_buffer_cmp(&local->initiator_address,
132 				    &remote->initiator_address) == FALSE)
133 			return (FALSE);
134 
135 	if (local->acceptor_addrtype != remote->acceptor_addrtype)
136 		return (FALSE);
137 
138 	if (local->acceptor_addrtype != GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR)
139 		if (gss_buffer_cmp(&local->acceptor_address,
140 				    &remote->acceptor_address) == FALSE)
141 			return (FALSE);
142 
143 	return (gss_buffer_cmp(&local->application_data,
144 				&remote->application_data));
145 }
146 
147 /*
148  * Generate an accept token for a context and channel binding puting the
149  * generated token output.
150  */
151 
152 static
153 OM_uint32
gen_accept_token(dh_gss_context_t ctx,gss_channel_bindings_t channel,gss_buffer_t output)154 gen_accept_token(dh_gss_context_t ctx, /* Diffie-Hellman context */
155 		gss_channel_bindings_t channel, /* channel bindings */
156 		gss_buffer_t output /* The accept token */)
157 {
158 	dh_token_desc token;
159 	/* Grap a pointer to the context_t part of the token */
160 	dh_cntx_t accept = &token.ver.dh_version_u.
161 				body.dh_token_body_desc_u.accept_context.cntx;
162 	dh_key_set keys;
163 	dh_channel_binding_desc dh_binding;
164 
165 	/* Set the version number from the context. */
166 	token.ver.verno = ctx->proto_version;
167 	/* Set the token type to be an ACCEPT token. */
168 	token.ver.dh_version_u.body.type = DH_ACCEPT_CNTX;
169 	/* Set our self as the remote for the other end. */
170 	accept->remote = ctx->local;
171 	/* The remote side to us is the local side at the other end. */
172 	accept->local = ctx->remote;
173 	/* Our context flags */
174 	accept->flags = ctx->flags;
175 	/* When we will expire */
176 	accept->expire = ctx->expire;
177 	/* Our channel bindings */
178 	accept->channel = GSS2DH_channel_binding(&dh_binding, channel);
179 	/* Package the context session keys into a key_set */
180 	keys.dh_key_set_len = ctx->no_keys;
181 	keys.dh_key_set_val = ctx->keys;
182 
183 	/* Build the token */
184 	return (__make_token(output, NULL, &token, &keys));
185 }
186 
187 /*
188  * Check if a credential is valid for the requested usage. Note that
189  * Diffie-Hellman only supports credentials based on the callers net
190  * name. netname will point to the users rpc netname. It is up to the
191  * caller to free the netname.
192  */
193 
194 static OM_uint32
validate_cred(dh_context_t cntx,OM_uint32 * minor,dh_cred_id_t cred,gss_cred_usage_t usage,dh_principal * netname)195 validate_cred(dh_context_t cntx, /* Diffie-Hellman mechanism context */
196 	    OM_uint32 *minor,	 /* Mechanism status */
197 	    dh_cred_id_t cred, /* Diffie-Hellman credential */
198 	    gss_cred_usage_t usage, /* Cred usage */
199 	    dh_principal *netname /* Cred owner */)
200 {
201 	/* Set minor status */
202 	*minor = DH_SUCCESS;
203 	*netname = NULL;
204 
205 	/*
206 	 * See if the users creditial is available, i.e.,
207 	 * the user is "key logged" in.
208 	 */
209 	if (!cntx->keyopts->key_secretkey_is_set()) {
210 		*minor = DH_NO_SECRET;
211 		return (GSS_S_NO_CRED);
212 	}
213 
214 
215 	/*
216 	 * Get the netname.
217 	 */
218 
219 	if ((*netname = cntx->keyopts->get_principal()) == NULL) {
220 		*minor = DH_NO_PRINCIPAL;
221 		return (GSS_S_NO_CRED);
222 	}
223 
224 	/*
225 	 * Check if the supplied cred is valid for the requested usage.
226 	 * The default cred never expires and has a usage of GSS_C_BOTH.
227 	 */
228 
229 	if ((gss_cred_id_t)cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
230 		if ((cred->usage != usage &&
231 		    cred->usage != GSS_C_BOTH) ||
232 		    strcmp(*netname, cred->principal) != 0) {
233 			free(*netname);
234 			return (GSS_S_NO_CRED);
235 		}
236 
237 		/* See if the cred is still valid */
238 		if (cred->expire != GSS_C_INDEFINITE &&
239 		    time(0) > cred->expire) {
240 			free(*netname);
241 			return (GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED);
242 		}
243 	}
244 	return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
245 }
246 
247 
248 /*
249  * establish_session_keys: This routine decrypts the session keys supplied
250  * and uses those keys to verifiy the signature over the input token
251  * match the signature in the token.
252  */
253 static OM_uint32
establish_session_keys(dh_context_t dhctx,const char * remote,dh_key_set_t keys,dh_signature_t sig,dh_token_t token)254 establish_session_keys(dh_context_t dhctx, const char *remote,
255 		    dh_key_set_t keys, dh_signature_t sig, dh_token_t token)
256 {
257 	OM_uint32 stat;
258 	int i, j;
259 	des_block *saved_keys;
260 	char *saved_sig;
261 
262 	/*
263 	 * The following variable is used by the keyopts key_decryptsessions
264 	 * entry point. If this variable is non zero and the underling
265 	 * mechanism uses a cache of public keys, then get the public key
266 	 * for the remote out of that cache. When key_decrptsessions return
267 	 * this variable will be set to non zero if the key did come
268 	 * out of the cache, otherwise it will be set to zero.
269 	 */
270 	int key_was_from_cache = 1;
271 
272 	/* Save the keyset so if we fail we can try again */
273 	if ((saved_keys = New(des_block, keys->dh_key_set_len)) == NULL)
274 		return (DH_NOMEM_FAILURE);
275 
276 	for (i = 0; i < keys->dh_key_set_len; i++)
277 		saved_keys[i] = keys->dh_key_set_val[i];
278 
279 	/* Save the unencrypted signature as well for retry attempt */
280 	if ((saved_sig = New(char, sig->dh_signature_len)) == NULL) {
281 		Free(saved_keys);
282 		return (DH_NOMEM_FAILURE);
283 	}
284 	memcpy(saved_sig, sig->dh_signature_val, sig->dh_signature_len);
285 
286 	/*
287 	 * We will try to decrypt the session keys up to two times.
288 	 * The first time will let the underlying mechanism use a
289 	 * public key cache, if the set of session keys fail to
290 	 * validate the signature that is reported in the deserialized
291 	 * token, and those session keys were decrypted by a key
292 	 * derived from a public key cache, then we will try again but
293 	 * this time will advise the underlying mechanism not to use
294 	 * its cache.
295 	 */
296 
297 	for (i = 0; key_was_from_cache && i < 2; i++) {
298 		/*
299 		 * Decrypt the session keys using the mechanism specific
300 		 * routine and if this is the second time, don't use
301 		 * the cache.
302 		 */
303 		if (i == 1)
304 			key_was_from_cache = 0;
305 		if (dhctx->keyopts->key_decryptsessions(remote,
306 							keys->dh_key_set_val,
307 							keys->dh_key_set_len,
308 							&key_was_from_cache)) {
309 			Free(saved_keys);
310 			Free(saved_sig);
311 			return (DH_SESSION_CIPHER_FAILURE);
312 		}
313 
314 #ifdef DH_DEBUG
315 		fprintf(stderr, "Received session keys %s the cache:\n",
316 			key_was_form_cache ? "using" : "not using");
317 		for (i = 0; i < keys->dh_key_set_len; i++)
318 			fprintf(stderr, "%08.8x%08.8x ",
319 				keys->dh_key_set_val[i].key.high,
320 				keys->dh_key_set_val[i].key.low);
321 		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
322 #endif
323 
324 		/*
325 		 * Now verify that the extracted signature from the
326 		 * deserialized token is the same as our calculation
327 		 * of the signature.
328 		 */
329 		if ((stat = __verify_sig(token, DH_MECH_QOP, keys, sig)) ==
330 		    DH_SUCCESS) {
331 			Free(saved_keys);
332 			Free(saved_sig);
333 			return (DH_SUCCESS);
334 
335 		}
336 
337 		/* Restore the keys and signature for retry */
338 		for (j = 0; j < keys->dh_key_set_len; j++)
339 			keys->dh_key_set_val[j] = saved_keys[j];
340 
341 		memcpy(sig->dh_signature_val, saved_sig, sig->dh_signature_len);
342 	}
343 
344 	Free(saved_keys);
345 	Free(saved_sig);
346 	return (stat);
347 }
348 /*
349  * This is the Diffie-Hellman mechanism entry point for the
350  * gss_accept_sec context. See RFC 2078 for details. This
351  * routine accepts a context establish token from the initator
352  * and optionally produces a token to send back to the initator to
353  * establish a GSS security context. The established context will
354  * be return via the *gss_ctx paramater.
355  */
356 
357 OM_uint32
__dh_gss_accept_sec_context(void * ctx,OM_uint32 * minor,gss_ctx_id_t * gss_ctx,gss_cred_id_t cred,gss_buffer_t input,gss_channel_bindings_t channel,gss_name_t * principal,gss_OID * mech,gss_buffer_t output,OM_uint32 * flags,OM_uint32 * expire,gss_cred_id_t * del_cred)358 __dh_gss_accept_sec_context(void *ctx, /* Per mechanism context */
359 			    OM_uint32 *minor, /* Mechanism status */
360 			    gss_ctx_id_t *gss_ctx, /* GSS context */
361 			    gss_cred_id_t cred, /* GSS credential */
362 			    gss_buffer_t input, /* Input from initiator */
363 				/* Local channel bindings  */
364 			    gss_channel_bindings_t  channel,
365 			    gss_name_t *principal, /* Initiator name */
366 			    gss_OID* mech, /* Returned mechanism */
367 			    gss_buffer_t output, /* Token to send initiator */
368 			    OM_uint32 *flags, /* flags of context */
369 			    OM_uint32 *expire, /* Time left on context */
370 			    gss_cred_id_t *del_cred /* Delegated credential */)
371 {
372 	dh_token_desc token;
373 	/* ctx is a Diffie-Hellman mechanism context */
374 	dh_context_t dhctx = (dh_context_t)ctx;
375 	dh_gss_context_t g_cntx = NULL;
376 	dh_principal netname = NULL;
377 	dh_init_context_t clnt;
378 	OM_uint32 stat;
379 	int i;
380 	dh_signature sig;
381 	struct gss_channel_bindings_struct dh_binding_desc;
382 	gss_channel_bindings_t dh_binding;
383 
384 	/* Check for required parameters */
385 	if (input == NULL)
386 		return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
387 	if (minor == NULL || output == NULL || gss_ctx == NULL)
388 		return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE);
389 
390 	/* Give outputs sane values if present */
391 	*minor = 0;
392 	if (principal)
393 		*principal = NULL;
394 	if (mech)
395 		*mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
396 	if (flags)
397 		*flags  = 0;
398 	if (expire)
399 		*expire = 0;
400 	if (del_cred)
401 		*del_cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
402 
403 	output->length = 0;
404 	output->value = 0;
405 
406 	/*
407 	 * Diffie-Hellman never returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED from a
408 	 * gss_accept_sec_context so the only context read should be
409 	 * GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT.
410 	 */
411 	if (*gss_ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
412 		return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
413 
414 	/* Valdidate the local credentinal and retrieve then principal name */
415 	stat = validate_cred(dhctx, minor,
416 			    (dh_cred_id_t)cred, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &netname);
417 	if (stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
418 		return (stat);
419 
420 	/*
421 	 * Deserialize the input into token, extracting the signature
422 	 * into sig. Where sig is our calculation of the MD5 check sum
423 	 * over the input token up to the signature.
424 	 */
425 	memset(&sig, 0, sizeof (sig));
426 	if (*minor = __get_ap_token(input, dhctx->mech, &token, &sig)) {
427 		free(netname);
428 		__free_signature(&sig);
429 		return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
430 	}
431 
432 	/* set clnt to point to the init context part of token */
433 	clnt = &token.ver.dh_version_u.body.dh_token_body_desc_u.init_context;
434 
435 	/* Check that this context is really for us */
436 	if (strcmp(clnt->cntx.local, netname) != 0) {
437 		free(netname);
438 		*minor = DH_NOT_LOCAL;
439 		stat = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
440 		goto cleanup;
441 	}
442 	free(netname);
443 
444 	/*
445 	 * See if this is a DH protocol version that we can handle.
446 	 * Currently we can handle the one and only DH_PROTO_VERSION.
447 	 */
448 
449 	if (token.ver.verno != DH_PROTO_VERSION) {
450 		*minor = DH_PROTO_MISMATCH;
451 		stat = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
452 		goto cleanup;
453 	}
454 
455 	/* Decrypt the session keys and verify the signature */
456 	if ((*minor = establish_session_keys(dhctx, clnt->cntx.remote,
457 					    &clnt->keys,
458 					    &sig, &token)) != DH_SUCCESS) {
459 		stat = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
460 		goto cleanup;
461 	}
462 
463 	/* Check that the channel bindings are the same */
464 	dh_binding = DH2GSS_channel_binding(&dh_binding_desc,
465 					    clnt->cntx.channel);
466 	if (!gss_chanbind_cmp(channel, dh_binding)) {
467 		stat = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
468 		goto cleanup;
469 	}
470 
471 	/* Everything is OK, so allocate the context */
472 	if ((g_cntx = New(dh_gss_context_desc, 1)) == NULL) {
473 		*minor = DH_NOMEM_FAILURE;
474 		stat = GSS_S_FAILURE;
475 		goto cleanup;
476 	}
477 
478 	/*
479 	 * The context is now established for us, though we may still
480 	 * need to send a token if the initiator requested mutual
481 	 * authentications.
482 	 */
483 	g_cntx->state = ESTABLISHED;
484 	/* We're not the initiator */
485 	g_cntx->initiate = 0;
486 	/* Set the protocol version from the token */
487 	g_cntx->proto_version = token.ver.verno;
488 	/* Initialize the sequence history */
489 	__dh_init_seq_hist(g_cntx);
490 	/* Set debug to false */
491 	g_cntx->debug = 0;
492 
493 	/* Set who the initiator is */
494 	if ((g_cntx->remote = strdup(clnt->cntx.remote)) == NULL) {
495 		*minor = DH_NOMEM_FAILURE;
496 		stat = GSS_S_FAILURE;
497 		goto cleanup;
498 	}
499 
500 	/* Set who we are */
501 	if ((g_cntx->local = strdup(clnt->cntx.local)) == NULL) {
502 		*minor = DH_NOMEM_FAILURE;
503 		stat = GSS_S_FAILURE;
504 		goto cleanup;
505 	}
506 
507 	/* Stash a copy of the session keys for the context */
508 	g_cntx->no_keys = clnt->keys.dh_key_set_len;
509 	if ((g_cntx->keys = New(des_block, g_cntx->no_keys)) == NULL) {
510 		*minor = DH_NOMEM_FAILURE;
511 		stat = GSS_S_FAILURE;
512 		goto cleanup;
513 	}
514 
515 	for (i = 0; i < g_cntx->no_keys; i++)
516 		g_cntx->keys[i] = clnt->keys.dh_key_set_val[i];
517 
518 	/* Set the flags and expire time */
519 	g_cntx->flags = clnt->cntx.flags;
520 	g_cntx->expire = clnt->cntx.expire;
521 
522 	/* Create output token if needed */
523 	if (g_cntx->flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) {
524 		if (*minor = gen_accept_token(g_cntx, channel, output)) {
525 			stat = GSS_S_FAILURE;
526 			goto cleanup;
527 		}
528 	}
529 
530 	/* This is now a valid context */
531 	if ((*minor = __dh_install_context(g_cntx)) != DH_SUCCESS) {
532 		stat = GSS_S_FAILURE;
533 		goto cleanup;
534 	}
535 
536 	/* Return the GSS context to the caller */
537 	*gss_ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)g_cntx;
538 
539 	/* Return the remote principal if requested */
540 	if (principal)
541 		*principal = (gss_name_t)strdup(g_cntx->remote);
542 	/* Return the flags if requested */
543 	if (flags)
544 		*flags = g_cntx->flags;
545 	/* Return the expire time if requested */
546 	if (expire)
547 		*expire = g_cntx->expire;
548 	/* Return the mechanism if requested */
549 	if (mech)
550 		*mech = dhctx->mech;
551 
552 	/* Release storage of the signature */
553 	__free_signature(&sig);
554 
555 	/* Tear down the deserialize token */
556 	xdr_free(xdr_dh_token_desc, (char *)&token);
557 
558 	/* We're done */
559 	return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
560 
561 cleanup:
562 	/* Destroy incomplete context */
563 	if (g_cntx) {
564 		__dh_destroy_seq_hist(g_cntx);
565 		(void) __dh_remove_context(g_cntx);
566 		free(g_cntx->remote);
567 		free(g_cntx->local);
568 		Free(g_cntx->keys);
569 		Free(g_cntx);
570 	}
571 
572 	/* Release the signature and the deserialized token. */
573 	__free_signature(&sig);
574 	xdr_free(xdr_dh_token_desc, (char *)&token);
575 
576 	return (stat);
577 }
578 
579 
580 /*
581  * gen_init_token: create a token to pass to the other side
582  * to create a GSS context.
583  */
584 static
585 OM_uint32
gen_init_token(dh_gss_context_t cntx,dh_context_t dhctx,gss_channel_bindings_t channel,gss_buffer_t result)586 gen_init_token(dh_gss_context_t cntx, /* Diffie-Hellman GSS context */
587 	    dh_context_t dhctx,    /* Diffie-Hellman mechanism context */
588 	    gss_channel_bindings_t channel, /* local channel bindings */
589 	    gss_buffer_t result /* The serialized token to send */)
590 {
591 	dh_token_desc token;	/* Unserialed token */
592 	dh_init_context_t remote;  /* init_context in token */
593 	dh_key_set keys, ukeys;	/* encrypted and unencrypted keys */
594 	int i, stat;
595 	dh_channel_binding_desc dh_binding;
596 
597 	/* Create key_set for session keys */
598 	if ((keys.dh_key_set_val = New(des_block, cntx->no_keys)) == NULL)
599 		return (DH_NOMEM_FAILURE);
600 
601 	keys.dh_key_set_len = cntx->no_keys;
602 	for (i = 0; i < cntx->no_keys; i++)
603 		keys.dh_key_set_val[i] = cntx->keys[i];
604 
605 	/* Initialize token from GSS context */
606 	memset(&token, 0, sizeof (token));
607 	token.ver.verno = cntx->proto_version;
608 	token.ver.dh_version_u.body.type = DH_INIT_CNTX;
609 
610 	/* Set remote to init_context part of token */
611 	remote = &token.ver.dh_version_u.body.dh_token_body_desc_u.init_context;
612 	/* We're the remote to the other side */
613 	remote->cntx.remote = cntx->local;
614 	/* And they are the local */
615 	remote->cntx.local = cntx->remote;
616 	/* Set our flags */
617 	remote->cntx.flags = cntx->flags;
618 	/* Set the expire time */
619 	remote->cntx.expire = cntx->expire;
620 	/* hand of our channel bindings */
621 	remote->cntx.channel = GSS2DH_channel_binding(&dh_binding, channel);
622 	/* set the tokens keys */
623 	remote->keys = keys;
624 
625 
626 	/* Encrypt the keys for the other side */
627 
628 	if (dhctx->keyopts->key_encryptsessions(cntx->remote,
629 						keys.dh_key_set_val,
630 						cntx->no_keys)) {
631 		Free(keys.dh_key_set_val);
632 		return (DH_SESSION_CIPHER_FAILURE);
633 	}
634 
635 	/* Package up our session keys */
636 	ukeys.dh_key_set_len = cntx->no_keys;
637 	ukeys.dh_key_set_val = cntx->keys;
638 	/*
639 	 * Make an APPLICATION 0 token and place it in result.
640 	 * Note that the unecrypted ukeys key_set is used to sign
641 	 * the token.
642 	 */
643 	stat =  __make_ap_token(result, dhctx->mech, &token, &ukeys);
644 
645 	/* We're don with the encrypted session keys */
646 	Free(keys.dh_key_set_val);
647 
648 	/* Return our status */
649 	return (stat);
650 }
651 
652 /*
653  * create_context: Builds the initial Diffie-Hellman GSS context.
654  * It should always be the case that *gss_ctx == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT
655  * on entering this routine. Given the inputs we created a Diffie-Hellman
656  * context from them. This routine will call gen_init_token above to
657  * generate the output token to pass to the other side.
658  */
659 static
660 OM_uint32
create_context(OM_uint32 * minor,dh_context_t cntx,dh_gss_context_t * gss_ctx,dh_principal netname,dh_principal target,gss_channel_bindings_t channel,OM_uint32 flags_req,OM_uint32 time_req,OM_uint32 * flags_rec,OM_uint32 * time_rec,gss_buffer_t results)661 create_context(OM_uint32 *minor, /* Diffie-Hellman specific status */
662 	    dh_context_t cntx, /* Diffie-Hellman mech context */
663 	    dh_gss_context_t *gss_ctx, /* DH GSS context */
664 	    dh_principal netname, /* Local principal */
665 	    dh_principal target, /* Remote principal */
666 	    gss_channel_bindings_t channel, /* Channel bindings */
667 	    OM_uint32 flags_req, /* Flags to set on context */
668 	    OM_uint32 time_req, /* Time to live for context */
669 	    OM_uint32 *flags_rec, /* Flags that were actually set */
670 	    OM_uint32 *time_rec, /* Time actually received */
671 	    gss_buffer_t results /* Output token for the other side */)
672 {
673 	dh_gss_context_t dh_gss_ctx; /* The Diffie-Hellman context to create */
674 	time_t now = time(0);	/* Used to set the expire time */
675 	OM_uint32 expire;	/* Time left on the context */
676 
677 	/* Create the Diffie-Hellman context */
678 	if ((*gss_ctx = dh_gss_ctx = New(dh_gss_context_desc, 1)) == NULL) {
679 		*minor = DH_NOMEM_FAILURE;
680 		return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
681 	}
682 
683 	/* We're not established yet */
684 	dh_gss_ctx->state = INCOMPLETE;
685 	/* We're the initiator */
686 	dh_gss_ctx->initiate = 1;
687 	/* Set the protocol version for the context */
688 	dh_gss_ctx->proto_version = DH_PROTO_VERSION;
689 	/* Initialize the sequence and replay history */
690 	__dh_init_seq_hist(dh_gss_ctx);
691 	/* Turn off debugging */
692 	dh_gss_ctx->debug = 0;
693 
694 	dh_gss_ctx->local = NULL;
695 
696 	/* Remember who we want to talk to. */
697 	if ((dh_gss_ctx->remote = strdup(target)) == NULL) {
698 		*minor = DH_NOMEM_FAILURE;
699 		goto cleanup;
700 	}
701 
702 	/* Rember who we are. */
703 	if ((dh_gss_ctx->local = strdup(netname)) == NULL) {
704 		*minor = DH_NOMEM_FAILURE;
705 		goto cleanup;
706 	}
707 
708 	/* Set up the session key */
709 	dh_gss_ctx->no_keys = 3;
710 	dh_gss_ctx->keys = New(des_block, 3);
711 	if (dh_gss_ctx->keys == NULL) {
712 		*minor = DH_NOMEM_FAILURE;
713 		goto cleanup;
714 	}
715 
716 	/* Call the mechanism specific key generator */
717 	if (cntx->keyopts->key_gendeskeys(dh_gss_ctx->keys, 3)) {
718 		*minor = DH_NOMEM_FAILURE;
719 		goto cleanup;
720 	}
721 
722 #ifdef DH_DEBUG
723 	{
724 		int i;
725 
726 		fprintf(stderr, "Generated session keys:\n");
727 		for (i = 0; i < dh_gss_ctx->no_keys; i++)
728 			fprintf(stderr, "%08.8x%08.8x ",
729 				dh_gss_ctx->keys[i].key.high,
730 				dh_gss_ctx->keys[i].key.low);
731 		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
732 	}
733 #endif
734 
735 	/*
736 	 *  We don't support currently support
737 	 *  GSS_C_ANON_FLAG and GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG and GSS_C_CONF_FLAG
738 	 */
739 
740 	dh_gss_ctx->flags = (flags_req &
741 	    (GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG |
742 		    GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG));
743 
744 	/* This mechanism does integrity */
745 	dh_gss_ctx->flags |=  GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG;
746 
747 	/* Return flags to the caller if they care */
748 	if (flags_rec)
749 		*flags_rec = dh_gss_ctx->flags;
750 
751 	/* Set expire, 0 is the default, which means indefinite */
752 	expire = time_req ? time_req : GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
753 	/* Actually set the expire time for the context */
754 	dh_gss_ctx->expire = expire == GSS_C_INDEFINITE ?
755 		expire : expire + now;
756 	/* Tell the call the time given to the context if they care */
757 	if (time_rec)
758 		*time_rec = expire;
759 
760 	/* Gennerate the output token to send to the other side */
761 	*minor = gen_init_token(dh_gss_ctx, cntx,
762 				channel, results);
763 	if (*minor != DH_SUCCESS)
764 		goto cleanup;
765 
766 	/* Recored this context as valid */
767 	if ((*minor = __dh_install_context(dh_gss_ctx)) != DH_SUCCESS)
768 		goto cleanup;
769 
770 	/* If we ask for mutal authentication return continue needed */
771 	dh_gss_ctx->state = dh_gss_ctx->flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG ?
772 		INCOMPLETE : ESTABLISHED;
773 
774 	return (dh_gss_ctx->state == ESTABLISHED ?
775 		GSS_S_COMPLETE : GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
776 cleanup:
777 
778 	__dh_destroy_seq_hist(dh_gss_ctx);
779 	free(dh_gss_ctx->remote);
780 	free(dh_gss_ctx->local);
781 	Free(dh_gss_ctx->keys);
782 	Free(dh_gss_ctx);
783 
784 	/*
785 	 * Let the caller of gss_init_sec_context know that they don't
786 	 * have a context.
787 	 */
788 	*gss_ctx = (dh_gss_context_t)GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
789 
790 	return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
791 }
792 
793 /*
794  * continue_context: Proccess the token from the otherside in the case
795  * of mutual authentication.
796  */
797 static
798 OM_uint32
continue_context(OM_uint32 * minor,gss_buffer_t token,dh_gss_context_t dh_gss_ctx,gss_channel_bindings_t channel)799 continue_context(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_buffer_t token,
800     dh_gss_context_t dh_gss_ctx, gss_channel_bindings_t channel)
801 {
802 	dh_key_set keys;
803 	dh_token_desc tok;
804 	dh_cntx_t remote_ctx;
805 	struct gss_channel_bindings_struct remote_chan_desc;
806 	gss_channel_bindings_t remote_chan;
807 
808 	/* Set minor to sane state */
809 	*minor = DH_SUCCESS;
810 
811 	/* This should never happen */
812 	if (token == NULL || token->length == 0)
813 		return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
814 
815 	/* Package the session keys for __get_token) */
816 	keys.dh_key_set_len = dh_gss_ctx->no_keys;
817 	keys.dh_key_set_val = dh_gss_ctx->keys;
818 
819 	/* Deserialize the input token into tok using the session keys */
820 	if (*minor = __get_token(token, NULL, &tok, &keys))
821 		return (*minor == DH_VERIFIER_MISMATCH ?
822 			GSS_S_BAD_SIG : GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
823 
824 	/*
825 	 * See if this is a Diffie-Hellman protocol version that we
826 	 * can handle. Currently we can only handle the protocol version that
827 	 * we initiated.
828 	 */
829 	if (tok.ver.verno != dh_gss_ctx->proto_version) {
830 		*minor = DH_PROTO_MISMATCH;
831 		xdr_free(xdr_dh_token_desc, (char *)&tok);
832 		return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
833 	}
834 
835 	/* Make sure this is the right type of token */
836 	if (tok.ver.dh_version_u.body.type != DH_ACCEPT_CNTX) {
837 		xdr_free(xdr_dh_token_desc, (char *)&tok);
838 		return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
839 	}
840 
841 	/* Grab a pointer to the context part of the token */
842 	remote_ctx = &tok.ver.dh_version_u.
843 			body.dh_token_body_desc_u.accept_context.cntx;
844 
845 	/* Make sure this is from the remote and for us */
846 	if (strcmp(remote_ctx->remote, dh_gss_ctx->remote) ||
847 	    strcmp(remote_ctx->local, dh_gss_ctx->local)) {
848 		xdr_free(xdr_dh_token_desc, (char *)&tok);
849 		return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
850 	}
851 
852 	/* Make sure if the optional channel_bindings are the same */
853 	remote_chan = DH2GSS_channel_binding(&remote_chan_desc,
854 					    remote_ctx->channel);
855 	if (!gss_chanbind_cmp(channel, remote_chan)) {
856 		xdr_free(xdr_dh_token_desc, (char *)&tok);
857 		return (GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS);
858 	}
859 
860 	/* Update the context flags with what the remote will accept */
861 	dh_gss_ctx->flags = remote_ctx->flags;
862 
863 	/* We now have an established context */
864 	dh_gss_ctx->state = ESTABLISHED;
865 
866 	/* Release the deserialized token, tok */
867 	xdr_free(xdr_dh_token_desc, (char *)&tok);
868 
869 	return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
870 }
871 
872 /*
873  * This is the Diffie-Hellman mechanism entry point for the
874  * gss_int_sec context. See RFC 2078 for details. This
875  * routine creates a new context or continues a previously created
876  * context if mutual authentication had been requested on the orignal
877  * context. The first call to this routine should set *context to
878  * GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT and input_token to GSS_C_NO_BUFFER or input_token->length
879  * to zero. To continue a context in the case of mutual authentication
880  * gss_ctx should point to the initial context and input_token should point
881  * to the token received from the remote. The established context will
882  * be return via the *context paramater in all cases.
883  */
884 
885 
886 OM_uint32
__dh_gss_init_sec_context(void * ctx,OM_uint32 * minor,gss_cred_id_t cred,gss_ctx_id_t * context,gss_name_t target,gss_OID mech,OM_uint32 req_flags,OM_uint32 time_req,gss_channel_bindings_t channel,gss_buffer_t input_token,gss_OID * mech_rec,gss_buffer_t output_token,OM_uint32 * flags_rec,OM_uint32 * time_rec)887 __dh_gss_init_sec_context(void *ctx, /* Per Mechananism context */
888 			OM_uint32 *minor, /* Mech status */
889 			gss_cred_id_t cred, /* Local credentials */
890 			gss_ctx_id_t *context, /* The context to create */
891 			gss_name_t target, /* The server to talk to */
892 			gss_OID mech, /* The mechanism to use */
893 			OM_uint32 req_flags, /* Requested context flags */
894 			OM_uint32 time_req, /* Requested life time */
895 			gss_channel_bindings_t channel, /* Local bindings */
896 			gss_buffer_t input_token, /* Token from remote */
897 			gss_OID *mech_rec, /* Optional mech to return */
898 			gss_buffer_t output_token, /* Token for remote */
899 			OM_uint32 *flags_rec, /* Actual flags received */
900 			OM_uint32 *time_rec /* Actual life time received */)
901 {
902 	dh_context_t cntx = (dh_context_t)ctx;
903 	dh_gss_context_t dh_gss_ctx = (dh_gss_context_t)*context;
904 	dh_principal netname;
905 	dh_cred_id_t dh_cred = (dh_cred_id_t)cred;
906 	OM_uint32 stat;
907 
908 	/* We need these */
909 	if (minor == 0 || output_token == 0)
910 		return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE);
911 
912 	/* Set to sane state */
913 	*minor = DH_SUCCESS;
914 	output_token->length = 0;
915 	output_token->value = NULL;
916 	if (mech_rec)
917 		*mech_rec = cntx->mech;   /* Note this should not be duped. */
918 
919 	/* Check that were the right mechanism */
920 	if ((mech != GSS_C_NULL_OID) &&
921 	    (!__OID_equal(mech, cntx->mech))) {
922 		return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
923 	}
924 
925 	/* Validate the cred and obtain our netname in the process. */
926 	stat = validate_cred(cntx, minor, dh_cred, GSS_C_INITIATE, &netname);
927 	if (stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
928 		return (stat);
929 
930 	/* validate target name */
931 	/*
932 	 * we could check that the target is in the proper form and
933 	 * possibly do a lookup up on the host part.
934 	 */
935 
936 	/* checks for new context */
937 	if (dh_gss_ctx == (dh_gss_context_t)GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
938 
939 		if (input_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER &&
940 			input_token->length != 0)
941 			return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
942 
943 		/* Create a new context */
944 		stat =  create_context(minor, cntx, &dh_gss_ctx, netname,
945 				    (dh_principal)target, channel, req_flags,
946 				    time_req, flags_rec, time_rec,
947 				    output_token);
948 
949 		/* Set the GSS context to the Diffie-Hellman context */
950 		*context = (gss_ctx_id_t)dh_gss_ctx;
951 
952 	} else {
953 
954 		/* Validate the context */
955 		if ((*minor = __dh_validate_context(dh_gss_ctx)) != DH_SUCCESS)
956 			return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
957 
958 		/* Authenticate the server */
959 		stat = continue_context(minor,
960 					input_token, dh_gss_ctx, channel);
961 
962 	}
963 
964 	free(netname);
965 	return (stat);
966 }
967