17c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 27c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * CDDL HEADER START 37c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * 47c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the 545916cd2Sjpk * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). 645916cd2Sjpk * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. 77c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * 87c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE 97c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. 107c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * See the License for the specific language governing permissions 117c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * and limitations under the License. 127c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * 137c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each 147c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. 157c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the 167c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying 177c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] 187c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * 197c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * CDDL HEADER END 207c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 217c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 22*ddf7fe95Scasper * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 237c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * Use is subject to license terms. 247c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 257c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 267c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #pragma ident "%Z%%M% %I% %E% SMI" 277c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 287c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <sys/param.h> 297c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <sys/types.h> 307c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <sys/sysmacros.h> 317c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <sys/systm.h> 327c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <sys/cred_impl.h> 337c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <sys/errno.h> 34*ddf7fe95Scasper #include <sys/klpd.h> 357c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <sys/proc.h> 367c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <sys/priv_impl.h> 377c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <sys/policy.h> 387c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <sys/ddi.h> 397c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <sys/thread.h> 407c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #include <c2/audit.h> 417c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 427c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 437c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * System call support for manipulating privileges. 447c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * 457c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * 467c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * setppriv(2) - set process privilege set 477c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * getppriv(2) - get process privilege set 487c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * getprivimplinfo(2) - get process privilege implementation information 497c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * setpflags(2) - set process (privilege) flags 507c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * getpflags(2) - get process (privilege) flags 517c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 527c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 537c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 547c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * setppriv (priv_op_t, priv_ptype_t, priv_set_t) 557c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 567c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate static int 577c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate setppriv(priv_op_t op, priv_ptype_t type, priv_set_t *in_pset) 587c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate { 597c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_set_t pset, *target; 607c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate cred_t *cr, *pcr; 617c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate proc_t *p; 62*ddf7fe95Scasper boolean_t donocd = B_FALSE; 637c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 647c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (!PRIV_VALIDSET(type) || !PRIV_VALIDOP(op)) 657c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (set_errno(EINVAL)); 667c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 677c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (copyin(in_pset, &pset, sizeof (priv_set_t))) 687c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (set_errno(EFAULT)); 697c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 707c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate p = ttoproc(curthread); 717c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate cr = cralloc(); 727c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock); 737c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 74*ddf7fe95Scasper retry: 757c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate pcr = p->p_cred; 767c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 777c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (audit_active) 787c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate audit_setppriv(op, type, &pset, pcr); 797c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 807c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 817c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * Filter out unallowed request (bad op and bad type) 827c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 837c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate switch (op) { 847c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate case PRIV_ON: 857c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate case PRIV_SET: 867c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 877c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * Turning on privileges; the limit set cannot grow, 887c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * other sets can but only as long as they remain subsets 897c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * of P. Only immediately after exec holds that P <= L. 907c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 91*ddf7fe95Scasper if (type == PRIV_LIMIT && 92*ddf7fe95Scasper !priv_issubset(&pset, &CR_LPRIV(pcr))) { 937c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate crfree(cr); 947c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (set_errno(EPERM)); 957c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 96*ddf7fe95Scasper if (!priv_issubset(&pset, &CR_OPPRIV(pcr)) && 97*ddf7fe95Scasper !priv_issubset(&pset, priv_getset(pcr, type))) { 98*ddf7fe95Scasper mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock); 99*ddf7fe95Scasper /* Policy override should not grow beyond L either */ 100*ddf7fe95Scasper if (type != PRIV_INHERITABLE || 101*ddf7fe95Scasper !priv_issubset(&pset, &CR_LPRIV(pcr)) || 102*ddf7fe95Scasper secpolicy_require_privs(CRED(), &pset) != 0) { 103*ddf7fe95Scasper crfree(cr); 104*ddf7fe95Scasper return (set_errno(EPERM)); 105*ddf7fe95Scasper } 106*ddf7fe95Scasper mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock); 107*ddf7fe95Scasper if (pcr != p->p_cred) 108*ddf7fe95Scasper goto retry; 109*ddf7fe95Scasper donocd = B_TRUE; 110*ddf7fe95Scasper } 1117c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate break; 1127c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1137c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate case PRIV_OFF: 1147c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* PRIV_OFF is always allowed */ 1157c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate break; 1167c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 1177c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1187c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 1197c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * OK! everything is cool. 1207c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * Do cred COW. 1217c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 1227c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate crcopy_to(pcr, cr); 1237c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1247c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 1257c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * If we change the effective, permitted or limit set, we attain 1267c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * "privilege awareness". 1277c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 1287c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (type != PRIV_INHERITABLE) 1297c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_set_PA(cr); 1307c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1317c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate target = &(CR_PRIVS(cr)->crprivs[type]); 1327c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1337c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate switch (op) { 1347c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate case PRIV_ON: 1357c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_union(&pset, target); 1367c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate break; 1377c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate case PRIV_OFF: 1387c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_inverse(&pset); 1397c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_intersect(target, &pset); 1407c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1417c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 1427c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * Fall-thru to set target and change other process 1437c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * privilege sets. 1447c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 1457c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /*FALLTHRU*/ 1467c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1477c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate case PRIV_SET: 1487c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate *target = pset; 1497c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1507c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 1517c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * Take privileges no longer permitted out 1527c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * of other effective sets as well. 1537c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * Limit set is enforced at exec() time. 1547c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 1557c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (type == PRIV_PERMITTED) 1567c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_intersect(&pset, &CR_EPRIV(cr)); 1577c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate break; 1587c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 1597c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1607c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 1617c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * When we give up privileges not in the inheritable set, 1627c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * set SNOCD if not already set; first we compute the 1637c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * privileges removed from P using Diff = (~P') & P 1647c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * and then we check whether the removed privileges are 1657c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * a subset of I. If we retain uid 0, all privileges 1667c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * are required anyway so don't set SNOCD. 1677c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 1687c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (type == PRIV_PERMITTED && (p->p_flag & SNOCD) == 0 && 1697c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate cr->cr_uid != 0 && cr->cr_ruid != 0 && cr->cr_suid != 0) { 1707c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_set_t diff = CR_OPPRIV(cr); 1717c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_inverse(&diff); 1727c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_intersect(&CR_OPPRIV(pcr), &diff); 1737c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate donocd = !priv_issubset(&diff, &CR_IPRIV(cr)); 1747c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 1757c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1767c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate p->p_cred = cr; 1777c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock); 1787c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1797c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (donocd) { 1807c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate mutex_enter(&p->p_lock); 1817c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate p->p_flag |= SNOCD; 1827c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate mutex_exit(&p->p_lock); 1837c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 1847c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1857c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate crset(p, cr); /* broadcast to process threads */ 1867c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1877c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (0); 1887c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 1897c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1907c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 1917c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * getppriv (priv_ptype_t, priv_set_t *) 1927c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 1937c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate static int 1947c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate getppriv(priv_ptype_t type, priv_set_t *pset) 1957c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate { 1967c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (!PRIV_VALIDSET(type)) 1977c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (set_errno(EINVAL)); 1987c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 1997c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (copyout(priv_getset(CRED(), type), pset, sizeof (priv_set_t)) != 0) 2007c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (set_errno(EFAULT)); 2017c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2027c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (0); 2037c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 2047c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2057c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate static int 2067c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate getprivimplinfo(void *buf, size_t bufsize) 2077c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate { 2087c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate int err; 2097c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2107c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate err = copyout(priv_hold_implinfo(), buf, min(bufsize, privinfosize)); 2117c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2127c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_release_implinfo(); 2137c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2147c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (err) 2157c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (set_errno(EFAULT)); 2167c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2177c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (0); 2187c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 2197c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2207c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 22145916cd2Sjpk * Set process flags in the given target cred. If NULL is specified, then 22245916cd2Sjpk * CRED() is used; otherwise the cred is assumed to be modifiable (i.e. newly 22345916cd2Sjpk * crdup'ed, or equivalent). Some flags are set in the proc rather than cred; 22445916cd2Sjpk * for these, curproc is always used. 2257c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * 2267c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * For now we cheat: the flags are actually bit masks so we can simplify 2277c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * some; we do make sure that the arguments are valid, though. 2287c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 2297c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 23045916cd2Sjpk int 23145916cd2Sjpk setpflags(uint_t flag, uint_t val, cred_t *tcr) 2327c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate { 2337c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate cred_t *cr, *pcr; 2347c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate proc_t *p = curproc; 2357c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate uint_t newflags; 23645916cd2Sjpk boolean_t use_curcred = (tcr == NULL); 2377c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2387c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (val > 1 || (flag != PRIV_DEBUG && flag != PRIV_AWARE && 23945916cd2Sjpk flag != NET_MAC_AWARE && flag != NET_MAC_AWARE_INHERIT && 240*ddf7fe95Scasper flag != __PROC_PROTECT && flag != PRIV_XPOLICY)) { 24145916cd2Sjpk return (EINVAL); 2427c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 2437c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2447c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (flag == __PROC_PROTECT) { 2457c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate mutex_enter(&p->p_lock); 2467c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (val == 0) 2477c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate p->p_flag &= ~SNOCD; 2487c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate else 2497c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate p->p_flag |= SNOCD; 2507c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate mutex_exit(&p->p_lock); 2517c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (0); 2527c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 2537c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 25445916cd2Sjpk if (use_curcred) { 25545916cd2Sjpk cr = cralloc(); 25645916cd2Sjpk mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock); 25745916cd2Sjpk pcr = p->p_cred; 25845916cd2Sjpk } else { 25945916cd2Sjpk cr = pcr = tcr; 26045916cd2Sjpk } 2617c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2627c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate newflags = CR_FLAGS(pcr); 2637c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2647c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (val != 0) 2657c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate newflags |= flag; 2667c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate else 2677c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate newflags &= ~flag; 2687c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 2697c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* No change */ 2707c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (CR_FLAGS(pcr) == newflags) { 27145916cd2Sjpk if (use_curcred) { 27245916cd2Sjpk mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock); 27345916cd2Sjpk crfree(cr); 27445916cd2Sjpk } 2757c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (0); 2767c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 2777c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 27845916cd2Sjpk /* 27997bedc9aSgfaden * Setting either the NET_MAC_AWARE or NET_MAC_AWARE_INHERIT 28097bedc9aSgfaden * flags is a restricted operation. 28197bedc9aSgfaden * 28297bedc9aSgfaden * When invoked via the PRIVSYS_SETPFLAGS syscall 28397bedc9aSgfaden * we require that the current cred has the net_mac_aware 28497bedc9aSgfaden * privilege in its effective set. 28597bedc9aSgfaden * 28697bedc9aSgfaden * When called from within the kernel by label-aware 28797bedc9aSgfaden * services such as NFS, we don't require a privilege check. 28897bedc9aSgfaden * 28945916cd2Sjpk */ 29045916cd2Sjpk if ((flag == NET_MAC_AWARE || flag == NET_MAC_AWARE_INHERIT) && 29145916cd2Sjpk (val == 1) && use_curcred) { 29297bedc9aSgfaden if (secpolicy_net_mac_aware(pcr) != 0) { 29345916cd2Sjpk mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock); 29445916cd2Sjpk crfree(cr); 29545916cd2Sjpk return (EPERM); 29645916cd2Sjpk } 29745916cd2Sjpk } 29845916cd2Sjpk 2997c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* Trying to unset PA; if we can't, return an error */ 3007c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (flag == PRIV_AWARE && val == 0 && !priv_can_clear_PA(pcr)) { 30145916cd2Sjpk if (use_curcred) { 30245916cd2Sjpk mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock); 30345916cd2Sjpk crfree(cr); 30445916cd2Sjpk } 30545916cd2Sjpk return (EPERM); 3067c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 3077c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 3087c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* Committed to changing the flag */ 30945916cd2Sjpk if (use_curcred) 31045916cd2Sjpk crcopy_to(pcr, cr); 3117c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (flag == PRIV_AWARE) { 3127c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (val != 0) 3137c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_set_PA(cr); 3147c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate else 3157c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate priv_adjust_PA(cr); 3167c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } else { 3177c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate CR_FLAGS(cr) = newflags; 3187c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 3197c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 320*ddf7fe95Scasper /* 321*ddf7fe95Scasper * Unsetting the flag has as side effect getting rid of 322*ddf7fe95Scasper * the per-credential policy. 323*ddf7fe95Scasper */ 324*ddf7fe95Scasper if (flag == PRIV_XPOLICY && val == 0) 325*ddf7fe95Scasper crsetcrklpd(cr, NULL); 326*ddf7fe95Scasper 32745916cd2Sjpk if (use_curcred) { 32845916cd2Sjpk p->p_cred = cr; 32945916cd2Sjpk mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock); 33045916cd2Sjpk crset(p, cr); 33145916cd2Sjpk } 3327c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 3337c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (0); 3347c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 3357c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 3367c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 3377c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * Getpflags. Currently only implements single bit flags. 3387c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 33945916cd2Sjpk uint_t 34045916cd2Sjpk getpflags(uint_t flag, const cred_t *cr) 3417c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate { 34245916cd2Sjpk if (flag != PRIV_DEBUG && flag != PRIV_AWARE && 343*ddf7fe95Scasper flag != NET_MAC_AWARE && flag != NET_MAC_AWARE_INHERIT && 344*ddf7fe95Scasper flag != PRIV_XPOLICY) 34545916cd2Sjpk return ((uint_t)-1); 3467c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 34745916cd2Sjpk return ((CR_FLAGS(cr) & flag) != 0); 3487c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 3497c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 3507c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate /* 3517c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate * Privilege system call entry point 3527c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate */ 3537c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate int 354*ddf7fe95Scasper privsys(int code, priv_op_t op, priv_ptype_t type, void *buf, size_t bufsize, 355*ddf7fe95Scasper int itype) 3567c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate { 35745916cd2Sjpk int retv; 358f48205beScasper extern int issetugid(void); 35945916cd2Sjpk 3607c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate switch (code) { 3617c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate case PRIVSYS_SETPPRIV: 3627c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (bufsize < sizeof (priv_set_t)) 3637c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (set_errno(ENOMEM)); 3647c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (setppriv(op, type, buf)); 3657c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate case PRIVSYS_GETPPRIV: 3667c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate if (bufsize < sizeof (priv_set_t)) 3677c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (set_errno(ENOMEM)); 3687c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (getppriv(type, buf)); 3697c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate case PRIVSYS_GETIMPLINFO: 3707c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (getprivimplinfo(buf, bufsize)); 3717c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate case PRIVSYS_SETPFLAGS: 37245916cd2Sjpk retv = setpflags((uint_t)op, (uint_t)type, NULL); 37345916cd2Sjpk return (retv != 0 ? set_errno(retv) : 0); 3747c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate case PRIVSYS_GETPFLAGS: 37545916cd2Sjpk retv = (int)getpflags((uint_t)op, CRED()); 37645916cd2Sjpk return (retv == -1 ? set_errno(EINVAL) : retv); 377f48205beScasper case PRIVSYS_ISSETUGID: 378f48205beScasper return (issetugid()); 379*ddf7fe95Scasper case PRIVSYS_KLPD_REG: 380*ddf7fe95Scasper if (bufsize < sizeof (priv_set_t)) 381*ddf7fe95Scasper return (set_errno(ENOMEM)); 382*ddf7fe95Scasper return ((int)klpd_reg((int)op, (idtype_t)itype, (id_t)type, 383*ddf7fe95Scasper buf)); 384*ddf7fe95Scasper case PRIVSYS_KLPD_UNREG: 385*ddf7fe95Scasper return ((int)klpd_unreg((int)op, (idtype_t)itype, (id_t)type)); 3867c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 3877c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate return (set_errno(EINVAL)); 3887c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 3897c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate 3907c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #ifdef _SYSCALL32_IMPL 3917c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate int 392*ddf7fe95Scasper privsys32(int code, priv_op_t op, priv_ptype_t type, caddr32_t buf, 393*ddf7fe95Scasper size32_t bufsize, int itype) 3947c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate { 395*ddf7fe95Scasper return (privsys(code, op, type, (void *)(uintptr_t)buf, 396*ddf7fe95Scasper (size_t)bufsize, itype)); 3977c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate } 3987c478bd9Sstevel@tonic-gate #endif 399