/* * CDDL HEADER START * * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions * and limitations under the License. * * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] * * CDDL HEADER END */ /* * Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. * Use is subject to license terms. */ /* * Key Management Functions * (as defined in PKCS#11 spec section 11.14) */ #include "metaGlobal.h" /* * meta_GenerateKey * */ CK_RV meta_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) { CK_RV rv; meta_session_t *session; meta_object_t *key = NULL; if (pMechanism == NULL || phKey == NULL) return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); rv = meta_handle2session(hSession, &session); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); rv = meta_object_alloc(session, &key); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; rv = meta_generate_keys(session, pMechanism, pTemplate, ulCount, key, NULL, 0, NULL); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; meta_object_activate(key); *phKey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE) key; finish: if (rv != CKR_OK) { if (key) (void) meta_object_dealloc(session, key, B_TRUE); } REFRELEASE(session); return (rv); } /* * meta_GenerateKeyPair * */ CK_RV meta_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey) { CK_RV rv; meta_session_t *session; meta_object_t *key1 = NULL, *key2 = NULL; if (pMechanism == NULL || phPublicKey == NULL || phPrivateKey == NULL) return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); rv = meta_handle2session(hSession, &session); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); rv = meta_object_alloc(session, &key1); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; rv = meta_object_alloc(session, &key2); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; rv = meta_generate_keys(session, pMechanism, pPublicKeyTemplate, ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, key1, pPrivateKeyTemplate, ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, key2); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; meta_object_activate(key1); meta_object_activate(key2); *phPublicKey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE) key1; *phPrivateKey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE) key2; finish: if (rv != CKR_OK) { if (key1) (void) meta_object_dealloc(session, key1, B_TRUE); if (key2) (void) meta_object_dealloc(session, key2, B_TRUE); } REFRELEASE(session); return (rv); } /* * meta_WrapKey * */ CK_RV meta_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen) { CK_RV rv; meta_session_t *session; meta_object_t *wrappingKey, *inputKey; if (pMechanism == NULL || pulWrappedKeyLen == NULL) return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); rv = meta_handle2session(hSession, &session); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); rv = meta_handle2object(hKey, &inputKey); if (rv != CKR_OK) { REFRELEASE(session); return (rv); } rv = meta_handle2object(hWrappingKey, &wrappingKey); if (rv != CKR_OK) { OBJRELEASE(inputKey); REFRELEASE(session); return (rv); } rv = meta_wrap_key(session, pMechanism, wrappingKey, inputKey, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen); finish: OBJRELEASE(inputKey); OBJRELEASE(wrappingKey); REFRELEASE(session); return (rv); } /* * meta_UnwrapKey * */ CK_RV meta_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) { CK_RV rv; meta_session_t *session; meta_object_t *unwrappingKey, *outputKey = NULL; if (pMechanism == NULL || pWrappedKey == NULL || phKey == NULL) return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); rv = meta_handle2session(hSession, &session); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); rv = meta_handle2object(hUnwrappingKey, &unwrappingKey); if (rv != CKR_OK) { REFRELEASE(session); return (rv); } rv = meta_object_alloc(session, &outputKey); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; (void) get_template_boolean(CKA_TOKEN, pTemplate, ulAttributeCount, &(outputKey->isToken)); rv = meta_unwrap_key(session, pMechanism, unwrappingKey, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, pTemplate, ulAttributeCount, outputKey); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; meta_object_activate(outputKey); *phKey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE) outputKey; finish: if (rv != CKR_OK) { if (outputKey) (void) meta_object_dealloc(session, outputKey, B_TRUE); } OBJRELEASE(unwrappingKey); REFRELEASE(session); return (rv); } /* * meta_DeriveKey * * This function is a bit gross because of PKCS#11 kludges that pass extra * object handles in some mechanism parameters. It probably needs to be * broken up into more managable pieces. */ CK_RV meta_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) { CK_RV rv; CK_MECHANISM *pMech = pMechanism; meta_session_t *session; meta_object_t *basekey1 = NULL, *basekey2 = NULL; meta_object_t *newKey1 = NULL, *newKey2 = NULL, *newKey3 = NULL, *newKey4 = NULL; boolean_t ssl_keys = B_FALSE; boolean_t tlsprf = B_FALSE; CK_MECHANISM metaMech; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *phBaseKey2 = NULL; CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS x942_params, *x9_tmpptr; CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS ecdh_params, *ec_tmpptr; CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *ssl_key_mat; CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *keyparams; if (pMech == NULL) { return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); } /* * Special case: Normally, the caller must always provide storage * for the derived key handle at phKey. Two (related) mechanisms * are special, in that multiple keys are instead returned via * pMech->pParameter. In these cases the spec says (see 12.38.4 * and 12.39.4) that phKey should be a NULL pointer, as it is not used. */ switch (pMech->mechanism) { case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE: case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE: keyparams = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS*)pMech->pParameter; if ((keyparams == NULL) || (pMech->ulParameterLen != sizeof (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS))) return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); ssl_key_mat = keyparams->pReturnedKeyMaterial; if (ssl_key_mat == NULL) return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); ssl_keys = B_TRUE; break; case CKM_TLS_PRF: tlsprf = B_TRUE; break; default: if (phKey == NULL) return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); }; rv = meta_handle2session(hSession, &session); if (rv != CKR_OK) return (rv); rv = meta_handle2object(hBaseKey, &basekey1); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; /* * A few oddball mechanisms pass a 2nd object handle in the parameters. * Here we validate that handle, and create a duplicate copy of the * mechanism and parameters. This is done because the application * does not expect these values to be changing, and could be using the * same data in multiple threads (eg concurrent calls to C_DeriveKey). * We copy the data to make sure there are no MT-Safe problems. */ switch (pMech->mechanism) { case CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE: /* uses CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS struct as the parameter */ if ((pMech->pParameter == NULL) || (pMech->ulParameterLen != sizeof (CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS))) { rv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; goto finish; } /* Duplicate the mechanism and paramaters */ ec_tmpptr = (CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMech->pParameter; ecdh_params = *ec_tmpptr; metaMech = *pMech; metaMech.pParameter = &ecdh_params; pMech = &metaMech; /* Get the key the application is providing */ phBaseKey2 = &ecdh_params.hPrivateData; break; case CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE: case CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE: /* both use CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS as the parameter */ if ((pMech->pParameter == NULL) || (pMech->ulParameterLen != sizeof (CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS))) { rv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; goto finish; } /* Duplicate the mechanism and paramaters */ x9_tmpptr = (CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMech->pParameter; x942_params = *x9_tmpptr; metaMech = *pMech; metaMech.pParameter = &x942_params; pMech = &metaMech; /* Get the key the application is providing */ phBaseKey2 = &x942_params.hPrivateData; break; case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: /* uses a CK_OBJECT_HANDLE as the parameter */ if ((pMech->pParameter == NULL) || (pMech->ulParameterLen != sizeof (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE))) { rv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; goto finish; } /* Duplicate the mechanism and paramaters */ metaMech = *pMech; pMech = &metaMech; /* Get the key the application is providing */ phBaseKey2 = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *) &metaMech.pParameter; break; default: /* nothing special to do. */ break; } if (phBaseKey2) { rv = meta_handle2object(*phBaseKey2, &basekey2); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; } /* * Allocate meta objects to store the derived key(s). Normally just * a single key is created, but the SSL/TLS mechanisms generate four. */ rv = meta_object_alloc(session, &newKey1); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; if (ssl_keys) { rv = meta_object_alloc(session, &newKey2); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; rv = meta_object_alloc(session, &newKey3); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; rv = meta_object_alloc(session, &newKey4); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; } /* Perform the actual key derive operation. */ rv = meta_derive_key(session, pMech, basekey1, basekey2, phBaseKey2, pTemplate, ulAttributeCount, newKey1, newKey2, newKey3, newKey4); if (rv != CKR_OK) goto finish; if (tlsprf) { (void) meta_object_dealloc(session, newKey1, B_TRUE); newKey1 = NULL; /* phKey isn't used (is NULL) for mechanism CKM_TLS_PRF. */ } else { /* Make derived key(s) active and visible to other threads. */ meta_object_activate(newKey1); if (ssl_keys) { meta_object_activate(newKey2); meta_object_activate(newKey3); meta_object_activate(newKey4); ssl_key_mat->hClientMacSecret = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE) newKey1; ssl_key_mat->hServerMacSecret = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE) newKey2; ssl_key_mat->hClientKey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE) newKey3; ssl_key_mat->hServerKey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE) newKey4; /* phKey isn't used (is NULL) for these SSL/TLS mechs */ } else { *phKey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE) newKey1; } } finish: if (rv != CKR_OK) { if (newKey1) (void) meta_object_dealloc(session, newKey1, B_TRUE); if (newKey2) (void) meta_object_dealloc(session, newKey2, B_TRUE); if (newKey3) (void) meta_object_dealloc(session, newKey3, B_TRUE); if (newKey4) (void) meta_object_dealloc(session, newKey4, B_TRUE); } if (basekey1) OBJRELEASE(basekey1); if (basekey2) OBJRELEASE(basekey2); REFRELEASE(session); return (rv); }